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The University of Kentucky, College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education, was organized in Fall of 1973, as the first permanently
staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures with the threefold purpose of assisting
Kentucky lawyers: to keep abreast of changes in the law resulting from statutory enactments, court decisions and administrative rulings;
to develop and sustain practical lawyering and litigation skills; and to maintain a high degree of professional competence in the various
areas of the practice of law.
An enormous debt of gratitude is owed to those who contribute their time, expertise and practical insight for the advance planning,
the instructional presentations, and the written materials that make our seminars possible.
The Office of Continuing Legal Education welcomes correspondence and comment regarding our overall curriculum, as well as our in-
dividual seminars and publications. We hope the seminars and the materials distributed in conjunction with them provide attorneys with
the invaluable substantive and practical information necessary to resolve society's increasingly complex legal problems in an efficient
and effective manner. To the extent that we accomplish this, we accomplish our goal.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN EVIDENCE LAW--1987
by
Robert G. Lawson
I. !nt(QQ~~tiQn: The cases selected for discussion in this paper
have only one common criterion; they provide interesting and valuable
instruction in the law of evidence. They were selected partially
. because of the breadth of their application, meaning that the rulings
in~crTmin-alc:.a~s~ouldapply in civil litigation and vice versa.
Thel'"e is a mix of feoer-al .. and state court opinions, but even here an
attempt was made to select cases which would likely be followed in
all courts. The objective of the lecture is not simply to provide
an update on recent decisions but rather to use recent decisions as a
basis for discussion of some important areas of evidence law.
A. !nt(QQ~~tiQn: In many instances, the admissibility of
evidence depends upon proof of preliminary facts. For example, a
dying declaration is admissible only if shown to have been made
under a consciousness of impending death. And a copy of a record
might be admissible only if the original is shown to have been
lost. In the totality of the law of evidence, there are hundreds
of such preliminary requirements. And, needless to say, with
respect to each there can be a conflict in the evidence offered
by the parties. The trial jUdge must resolve this conflict in
order to rule on admissibility. With respect to this part of the
trial court's responsibility, there is an important body of law
for lawyers to know. The Supreme Court of the United States
recently decided an important case in this area.
B. §Q~(i~il~ v. YDit~Q_§t~t~§, 41 Crim. L. Rep. 3350 (June 23,
1987) •
1. E~~t§: The evidence in question was a out of court
statement offered under the hearsay exception for statements
of coconspirators. Such statements are admissible under the
Federal Rules only upon preliminary proof of the existence
of a conspiracy and of the involvement in that conspiracy of
the person against whom the evidence is offered. In this
case, there was a dispute in the evidence on both of these
preliminary facts. The trial judge resolved the conflict
against the defendant in this case and admitted the
evidence. The defendant challenged this ruling before the
Supreme Court on two grounds: (1) He argued that in
admitting the hearsay the trial judge erronously used the
preponderance of evidence standard in resolving the conflict
o-O-the prel i roi nary facts;~and (2) he argued that the tri al
judge erred in using the content of the hearsay statements
to find the preliminary facts needed for admissibility of
the hearsay (i.e., he bootstrapped the hearsay into
evidence). The Supreme Court sustained the rulings of the
trial judge.
A- 1
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2. §t!Og!~g_gf_~~!§~~~m~ot: Rule 104(a) of the Federal J~
Rules imposes on the trial judge the obligation of resolving
disputes of fact crucial to admissibility of evidence. But,
it does not define the standard of proof to be used by the J
judge in resolving such disputes.,
i. Most courts have used preponderance of evidence as
the standard of proof for most preliminary issues, even
in dealing with admissibility of evidence against a
criminal defendant. But there have been exceptions to
this rule. For example, some courts have required that
a conspiracy be proved by clear and convincing evidence
before admitting statements by coconspirators. And
most federal courts require that evidence of other bad
acts be proved by clear and convincing evidence before
being admitted against an accused.
11. In ~g~~i!!l~ the Supreme Court ruled that
admissibility determinations under the Federal Rules
which hinge on factual questions are to be resolved by
the preponderance of evidence standard. The Court
mentions no exceptions to the rule.
J
J
I
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J
J
111. The Court specifically noted that it was not I
ruling on the standard of proof to be used for issues J
arising under Rule 104(b). These issues carry the
label "conditional relevancy" and have traditionally
imposed on the offering party a lesser standard of J.
proof. Authentication of writings is an example of a .
conditional relevancy issue.
I
J
J
J
i. Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules provides that in
determining preliminary questions concerning
admissibility, the trial court is not bound by the
rules of evidence law (except for privileges). This is
the rule that turned out to be pivotal.
ii. One clear implication of Rule 104(a) is that a J
trial court may consider hearsay evidence in resolving
preliminary issues. On this point there has been no
doubt or controversy. J
111. However, in decisions predating the adoption of
the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court had indicated (if I
not held) that in ruling on admissibility of evidence a ~
trial court must rely only on independent evidence
(i.e., not that whose admissibility is in question) in
resolving preliminary fact questions. In ~g~~i!!l~ the J
defendant tried to rely on these earlier cases.
3. ~ggt§t~!~~!Og_~~!Q~O£§: The Supreme Court ruling on
this second issue is far more important than its first
ruling and a bit more surprising.
J
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iv. The Court held that Rule 104 allows the trial
judge to consider any evidence whatsoever in making his
rulings on admissibility to the jury, except for
evidence ~tected by privilege. This includes the
evi dence whose admissi bi-lity is bei ng deci ded, sai d the
Court.
v. In so ruling the Court expressly declared that it
was not deciding whether or not a judge could base a
finding of a preliminary fact solely upon the evidence
whose admissibility was being determined. It said:
lilt is sufficient for today to hold that a court in
making a preliminary factual determination under Rule
edTCdJ,2ltEJ inay ex ami oe the hearsay statement sought
to be admitted."
vi. This is an important ruling with wide application.
1. ~~nn1at~( v. Ig~n_gf_~gQl~, 812 F.2d 1265 (lOth Cir.
1987): The defendant had a road crew working on a highway
without warning signs for motorists. Plaintiff came upon
the scene of the construction, drove his car off the highway
and crashed. He suffered serious injuries and became a
paraplegic. At trial he was allowed over objection to use a
videotape presentation to show how the injury had affected
his daily routine. A typical "Day in the Life" film, it
was prepared solely for litigation and showed a variety of
everyday situations involving the plaintiff. The defendant
objected to the evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403 on the ground
of undue prejudice. The videotape was admitted and the
plaintiff got a verdict. The defendant appealed.
i. The Court said that the Day in a Life films raise
special concerns about prejudicial impact. The trial
court must determine on a case by case basis whether
this prejudice is outweighed by the probative value of
the evidence. The determination is within the
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on
appeal only upon a shOWing of abuse.
11. The Court identified several factors to be weighed
in making the decision on admissibility: (1) The film
must fairly represent the impact of the injuries on the
plaintiff"s day-to-day activities and would not do so
if it depicted tne victim in unlikely circumstances or
doing improbable tasks; (2) exaggerated difficulties in
perfo~g ordinary tasks presents a danger of
~_-~ -----pre3udice; (3) conduct that serves little purpose other
---~ than to create sympathy for the plaintiff is highly
prejudicial; (4) film evidence is likely to have a
dominating effect over conventionally elicited
testimony, a factor which must be taken into account in
A- 3
B.
weighing probative value against prejudice; and (5) the
presence of the victim for cross-examination reduces
the risk of undue prejudice and is a factor for
consideration.
111. The Court held that the judge carefully weighed
prejudice potential against probative value and that it
could not find an abuse of his discretion.
§Q~£i21_~Q~~: This case considered another interesting
question about the use of Day in the Life films. In
his closing argument in this case, the plaintiff's
lawyer showed the jury a videotape which included part
of the Day in the Life film, part of another videotape
demonstration of how the vehicle flipped, and part of a
physician's taped deposition. Objection was made to
this form of closing argument and overruled. The Court
held on appeal that this was within the discretion of
the trial judge.
2. ~Ql§~~ig9~ v. ~~Q~~21_~2iQ~_EQ~~~_~Q~, 621 F.Supp. 1202
(D.C.Me 1985): The admissibility of a Day in the Life film
was questioned in this case as well. The evidence was ruled
inadmissible. The court gave several reasons: (1) an
edited tape necessarily raises issues of whether the event
shown is fairly representational of fact; (2) it raises
issues of undue prejudice because of the manner of
presentation; (3) because the plaintiff is aware of being
videotaped for purposes of litigation, the film is likely to
cause self-serving behavior; (4) the film is troublesome
because it dominates evidence more conventionally produced;
and (5) it distracts the jury from other cogent issues which
must be considered to produce a fair verdict.
i. The Court did not rule such films inadmissible per
se.
ii. It ruled that it should be admitted only when the
tape conveys observations of a witness to the jury more
fully and accurately than for some specific,
articulable reason the witness could convey them
through conventional examination.
1. §~Q~~21: For a long time, the law has recognized the
admissibility of filmed experiments or demonstrations
purporting to duplicate the event or accident involved in
the litigation.
J
J
J
J
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J
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i. ~2§i£_B~g~i~~m~Q~: It is generally stated that the J.
evidence is admissible only if the experiment or
demonstration was conducted under substantially 5imilar
conditions to those which existed at the time of the
accident. However, it is also said that "admissibility J
~4 J
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••• does not depend on perfect identity between
actual and experimental conditions. Ordinarily,
dissimilarities affect the weight of the evidence, not
its admissibility." Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d
1226, 1233-34 (8th Cir. 1982).
-~ Q!!!S:;,!:-§1iQ!:1: The rul e stated above obvi ousl y call s
for a judgment py the trial judge about the degree of
similarity between the experiment and the event under
litigation. Consequen_t~appealscourts have said
with respect to tilis eVldence 'that lithe admissibility
of evidence of experimental tests rests largely in the
discretion of the trial jUdge and his decision will not
be overturned absent a clear showing of an abuse of
discretion." §e!:~D.£~~!:1~1~t v. §~!:1~!:~!_~Q1Q!:E' 771 F.2d
1112,1124 (8th Cir. 1985).
iii. ~~!~ v. Ei!:~E1Q!:1~_Ii!:~_~_B~QQ~!:_~Q~,756 F.2d
1322 (8th Cir. 1985), is illustrative of situations in
which abuse of discretion may be found in admitting
such evidence. This was a products liability case
involving a tire rim explosion. The film in question
was based on a demonstration involving a different rim
than the one involved in the accident under litigation
with significant differences in air pressure in the two
situations (among other differences). The ruling of
the trial judge admitting the evidence was found to be
an abuse of his discretion.
2. Q~mQ!:1E1!:~1i!:1g_e!:i!:1£ie!~E_Qf_eb~Ei£E: Recent cases
involving videotape of experiments or demonstrations seem to
have added a new wrinkle to this area of the law. It is one
that makes application of the foregoing principles more
difficult than they would otherwise be. The following cases
are illustrative:
.
i. ~~!:1!:1iE1~!: v. IQ~!:1_Qf_~QQ!~, E~e!:~: In this case
the plaintiff's car left the highway at a construction
site and crashed. At trial the plaintiff was permitted
to introduce a videotape of an experiment in which a
car like the one involved in the accident was run over
an inclined ramp to become airborne before landing. It
was offered by the plaintiff not as a recreation of the
accident but as a demonstration showing lithe trajectory
of this type of car with this type of suspension
system.. " The defendant argued that it was an attempted
recreation-of~the accident and had substantial
dissrmflarities with the actual accident. Held: the
evidence was introduced to demonstrate physical
principles and not to recreate the accident; thus, the
ruling by the judge was not an abuse of discretion.
ii. ~b~me~~~ v. E!:~~b~~f_~Q!:e~, 814 F.2d 1271 (8th
Cir. 1987): This was a products liability case against
the manufacturer of the trailer vehicle of a
A- 5
tractor-trailer rig. The claim was that the brakes on
the trailer failed, caused the vehicle to jackknife,
and injured the driver's neck. The plaintiff testified
at trial that he was driving the vehicle on a winding
road at 35 mph, braked a quarter mile before reaching a
curve, had a brake failure, tried to brake twice more,
and jackknifed in the curve. At trial the defendant
introduced evidence of a videotape experiment showing
that a rig driven as the plaintiff claimed he drove the
one involved in the accident would have coasted to a
stop before reaching the curve under conditions
described by the plaintiff. The experiment was not
conducted under circumstances identical to the ones
involved in the accident. The Court ruled the evidence
admissible nonetheless: "The experiment did not need
to be performed in similar circumstances in order to be
admissible because it did not purport to be a
recreation of the accident and it was merely used to
demonstrate general principles of physics as applied to
[plaintiff's] testimony." IQ:.. at 1278.
iii. §~~i~g~ v. §~n~~~i_~gig~a_~g~e:.., 728 F.2d 566
(1st Cir. 1984): This was a products case. The
plaintiff's car left the highway, struck a concrete
culvert, and stopped among some trees. He claimed that
the wheel came off and caused him to lose control of
the car. The defendant claimed that he left the
highway negligently and that the wheel was torn off
when the car hit the culvert. At trial, the defendant
was permitted to introduce a film of a demonstration of
a vehicle being run on a track until the wheel struck a
concrete block barrier and lost that wheel when it came
over the lug nuts. This film was used by an expert
witness to testify that the cause of the accident was
as the defendant alleged. The appeals court ruled that
the film had been properly admitted: "They were not
offered as a re-creation or representation of how the
accident actually happened. The films depicted an
experiment illustrating Tomlinson's theory of the cause
of the accident. They were an aid to the jury's
understanding of his testimony. "IQ:.. at 567.
iii. !b~_E~gQi~m: The difficulty involved in dealing
with the new wrinkle is illustrated well by the case of
§i~Qb~ii v. §~n~~~i_~gig~a_~g~e:.., 743 F.2d 1049 (4th
Cir. 1984). The plaintiff bought an automobile
manufactured by the defendant and immediately began to
experience trouble with the brakes; the brakes would
occasionally lock with only slight pressure on the
petal and cause the car to skid. He took the car in
for repairs but no flaws were found. Shortly after
that he was driving the car when it collided with a
utility pole causing him serious injuries. He sued
alleging a design defect which caused the brakes to
lock. At trial the defendant was permitted to show a
A- 6
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videotape demonstration of a braking test of a vehicle
of the same type. There was great differences in the
conditions under which the test was conducted and those
which existed at the time of the accident; for example,
the accident involved travel down a sloping hill and
into a sharp curve while the test was on a flat surface
with the vehicle going straight. Objection was made to
the film and the defendant responded that it was not
being offered as a recreation of the accident but only
~~~ to establ i sh certai n operati ng characteri sti cs of the
. _ The film was admitted into evidence.
On appeal-, the~C0l..trt said "it is possible to call
almost any evidence of this type 'a demonstration to
illustrate a principle~lI. It concluded that this film
portrayed a physical representation of how the
automobile would operate under given conditions and
that such evidence should not be permitted unless the
substantial similarity requirement is met. Otherwise,
the opposing party will be prejudiced by the evidence.
A. IQ~LQg~£~tQQ: The case of Bt££t~Lgt v. gbtlgL~Q:§_~Q§~t~21
~~gt£2!_g~Q~~L' 811 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1987), presents some issues
of interest and importance with respect to the admissibility and
use of medical records. The case involved a malpractice action
against doctors and a hospital for neurological difficulties
suffered by the plaintiff after open heart surgery. The alleged
negligence occurred according to the plaintiff when a device used
for circulating the blood from the heart-lung machine back into
the body during the heart bypass came out accidentally. There
was a denial of the allegation.
1. At trial, the plaintiff offered into evidence a note on
his medical chart which indicated that during the surgery
there was an episode of the device in question being
accidentally out for 40 to 60 seconds. The note was dated
two days after the operation and was made by a neurology
resident. This was the plaintiff's sole evidence of
negligence. Objection was made to its admissibility on
hearsay grounds. The trial judge ruled it inadmissible
after learning that the neurology resident lacked personal
knowledge of the incident and could not recall who had given
him the information about t.he incident. The plaintiff
attempted to have his expert witness express an opinion that
the ca-Llseaf his problems-was an injurious embolus which
resulted when the deviee in question came out. The expert
could express this opinion only by relying on the note. The
trial court ruled the opinion improper. With no other
evidence to introduce, the plaintiff lost by directed
verdict. He appealed and lost again.
2. The fact situation presents important questions about
the application of the business records exception to medical
records. And, it presents an important question about the
right of an expert to rely on hearsay in forming opinions.
A-7
1. §~Q~C~!: Business records are admissible under Fed.R.
Evid. 803(6); this rule is indistinguishable from the rule
which is followed in state courts in Kentucky. Medical
records are treated as business records and are generally
admissible under this exception. The most important point
made by this case is that the mere fact that information is
contained in a medical record does not make it admissible
under the law of hearsay. For several reasons, speci~ic
information contained in records that are generally covered
by the business records exception may be inadmissible.
i. Probably the most common reason for excluding
information contained in hospital records is that it
lacks pertinence to treatment or diagnosis--which is
what gives such records their special trustworthiness.
ii. The reason the information in B!ss!~Cgi is not
admissible involves the prerequisites for application
of the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
i. ~~§iS_B~g~ic~m~Qt: To be admissible as hearsay, a
business record must be made by someone with knowledge
of the event recorded in the record or on the basis of
information provided to the recorder by someone who has
personal knowledge of the event and a business duty to
report it. Proof of this fact is a part of the
foundation for introducing business or medical records.
ii. In Biss!~Cgi the maker of the entry in question
did not have personal knowledge of the incident
recorded in the medical chart. In his testimony he
said that he did not know the source of the information
which caused him to make the entry; he said that he
normally spoke with nurses and staff attending a
patient before, during, and after surgery. In this
instance, however, he could not recall speaking with
any members of the surgical team.
iii. B~!!Qg: The record in not admissible under the
business records exception because of the absence of
proof of the source of the information: "An unknown
source is hardly trustworthy." 19. at 23.
iVa ~Qt~: An argument could be made that the proof of
circumstances in this instance provided sufficient
evidence of the source of the information to satisty
the prerequisite for admissibility. The entrant was a
physician who was involved in treating the patient, he
usually got information from members of the surgical
team (although he could not recall doing so in this
instance), and the information itself is indicative of
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a source who would have personal knowledge. The
contrary ruling of the court shows the importance of
understanding the prerequisites for admissiblity of
such records.
3. Qib~L_~~sL§s~_~~£~~ilQn§: The plaintiff attempted to
gain admissibility of the chart entry under the exceptions
for past recollection recorded, residual hearsay, and
adoptive admissions.
i. It was ruled inadmissible under past recollection
recorded for the same reason it was excluded under the
business records exception. The recorder must be shown
to have had personal knowledge of the matter contained
in the record. He did not in this instance.
ii. It was ruled inadmissible under the residual
exception because of a belief by the Court that the
record did not satisfy the requirement that such
hearsay have "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent" to that which exists with
other hearsay exceptions. Since it did not satisfy the
trustworthiness requirements of the business records
exception it could not be admissible as residual
hearsay.
iii. The strongest alternative argument was that the
chart entry was an adoptive admission by the
defendants. The Court indicated that if the plaintiff
had proved that the chart had been read by the
defendant physicians without objection to the specific
entry then the record could have been admitted as an
adoptive admission. This proof was lacking; the record
was not admissible under this exception.
1. IniLQg~£tlQn: The plaintiff attempted to overcome his
inability to get the chart entry into evidence by relying on
Fed.R.Evid. 703 which allows experts to use inadmissible
hearsay evidence in the formulation of opinions. The record
would not be substantively admissible but could form the
basis for admissible opinion. In this instance, this
approach might have saved the plaintiff's case by giving him
some evidence (the expert's opinion) of negligence.
i. Rule 703 requires that information relied on by the
expert be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in formulat.ing opini(JOson the subject. The Kentucky
law is idemtiJ=.al -te this, although it uses the word
n~!Jj$t.~ry" in place of "reasonable".
ii. The expert witness told the court that if he could
rely on the chart entry it would be his opinion that
the cause of the plaintiff's injuries was that the
A-9
device in question had come out during surgery.
Without the chart entry he could not express that
opinion.
2. 8~!!ng: The Court held that the expert could not rely
on the chart entry in forming his opinion.
i. In so ruling the Court said that the plaintiff had
not established the prerequisite described above,
namely, "reasonable reliance". It did not say that the
prerequisite could never be satisfied in a comparable
situation.
ii. The testimony of the expert about the inadmissible
information will usually be critical on the preliminary
issue of "reasonable reliance". If he says that the
information is of the type experts usually rely upon
then the judge will have to decide if the experts are
reasonable in so doing. In this case, the expert said
that the entry was "bizarre" and that he had never seen
such an entry in a medical chart. This is short of the
proof needed for use by an expert of inadmissible
hearsay.
A. !ni~QQ~£i!Qn: Opinion testimony, particularly from expert
witnesses, continues to be troublesome under Kentucky law. It is
difficult to reconcile decisions of the appeals courts and to
predict what kind of opinion testimony is admissible and what is
not admissible. A few years ago the Supreme Court of Kentucky
reinstated the rule prohibiting testimony on an ultimate fact,
which is the opposite of what the Federal Rules did. At least
some of the difficulty in the law is attributible to the problems
involved in determining what is and is not an ultimate fact.
With this background, an effort is made below to present some of
the recent Kentucky cases on opinion evidence.
B. ~QmmQn~~s!ib v. 8Qa~, 725 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1987): The
defendant killed her husband after a stormy marriage during which
she had been beaten, threatened with death, and otherwise abused
on numerous occasions. On the night of the shooting, according
to the defendant, she was kicked and threatened. She got a gun
from the bathroom, shot her unarmed husband between the eyes, and
of course caused his death instantly. She defended on the
grounds of self-defense. At trial she called as a witness a
registered nurse with extensive experience in cases involving
women who had been beaten by their husbands. She was permitted
to testify about characteristics and consequences of what is
called "battered wife syndrome", specifically why an abused wife
stays with her husband and the reaction that follows. She was
not permitted, however, to testify that the accused was sUffering
same at time of the shooting and she was not permitted to testify-
that the accused feared for her life at the time of the shooting.
A-l0
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The Court of Appeals ruled that it was error not to allow this
testimony. The Supreme Court ruled otherwise and sustained the
trial court ruling.
1. §~Q~~s!_§~l~Qtlfl~_e~~~QtsQ~~: In 1982, in the case of
~~g~Q v. ~gmmgQ~~e!tb, 639 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1982), the
Supreme Court seemed to reject the requirement that evidence
based on scientific principles had to have received general
scientific acceptance in order to be admissible. But the
court has definitely ignored the ruling in ~~g~Q since then;
the requirement is alive and well in Kentucky.
i. In a case by the name of ben1~i2 v. ~gmmgQ~~e!tn,
713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1986), the Court had ruled expert
opinion on what is called "sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome" inadmissible because of the absence of
evidence of general scientific acceptance.
ii. In Bg§~ the Court distinguished beQt~12 and found
that there was evidence sufficient to demonstrate the
scientific acceptability of the battered wife syndrome.
On this basis, the Court concluded that a qualified
witness could testify about this concept.
2. §~gQ~_gf_eQml§§l~!~_~~Q~~t_gQiQlgQ: The Court ruled
that it was proper for a qualified expert to testify about
the battered wife syndrome. It viewed this as scientific
evidence and found that it would assist the trier of fact in
resolving the issues of the case; of course, "assist the
trier" is the standard used in the Federal Rules to judge
the admissibility of all expert testimony. The Court ruled
that a qualified witness would not be permitted to testify
that a particular accused suffered the syndrome or that the
accused believed in the need for self defense at the time of
alleged crime.
i. The Court, in denying the testimony, seemed to rely
upon the ultimate fact doctrine.
11. It is difficult to see how testimony that the
accused had the syndrome is an ultimate fact. It is
also easy to see how the jury would be aided by such
testimony Trom a qualified witness.
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iii. It is easy to see that the opinion about the
accused's belief in the need for self defense is an
ultimate fju:t;. It is also easy to see how the evidence
c~-b~excludedwithout reliance on the ultimate fact
- -i~le, which makes application of opinion law difficult.
The opinion runs to a person~s state of mind, involves
much speculation, adds little to what the jury could do
on its own from the other evidence, and thus does not
assist the jury.
A-ll
C. ~~m~EE v. gQ!~m2n, 729 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1987): The plaintiff
was injured in an automobile accident at a time when she was not
wearing her seat belts. Prior to trial, the defendants employed
a physician to examine the plaintiff and offer testimony. At
trial the defendants offered into evidence testimony that the
plaintiff was not wearing her seat belts and opinion evidence
from the physician that had the plaintiff been wearing her belt
she probably would not have suffered the injuries which she
received and which necessitated medical care. The trial court
~ruled the seat belt evidence inadmissible. This ruling was the
principal subject of the Court"s opinion.
1. §~n~~2!_B~!~_Qn_§~2t_§~!t_~YiQ~n~~: In dealing with the
seat belt question, the Court framed the issue as one which
involves simply an issue of relevancy under the law of
evidence. Is evidence of the type offered in this case
relevant to the element of contributory fault? The Court
held that it was relevant and could be proved by a competent
expert witness.
2. gQm~~t~n~~_Qf_~itn§EE: In this case the plaintiff
argued that even if such evidence is held relevant the
physician was not competent as an expert to testify that the
injuries would not have occurred had the plaintiff been
wearing seat belts. The Supreme Court did not resolve this
question, believing that it had not been considered fully at
trial. It said that the qualifications of the witness seem
to be limited to familiarity with medical literature
(apparently on the subject) and expressed some doubts about
the qualifications of the witness. However, the Court
concluded that lithe decision as to whether a witness is
qualified to give expert testimony rests initially in the
sound discretion of the trial court. II !Q.=.. at 179.
3. §~~~i2!_gQmm§ntl In this opinion, it is worthy of note
that the Court said nothing at all about the expert"s
opinion being on an ultimate fact. But the essence of the
testimony of the expert in a case such as this would be that
the cause of the injuries to the plaintiff was the failure
to use seat belts. Is this not testimony running to an
ultimate fact?
i. The ultimate fact rule was rejected years ago in
Kentucky and in other jurisdictions for several
reasons: (1) It is very di ff i cuI t to determi ne what is
an ultimate fact for purposes of the rule; (2) it leads
to inconsistent decisions; and (3) it distracts the
court from more important considerations concerning the
admissibility of opinion evidence.
11. The important thing to understand, as you try to
follow the decisions of our appeals courts and deal
with this area of the law at trial, is that there will
be instances in which opinion evidence on ultimate
A-12
J
J
J
J
J
.~
J
I
..
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
r
r
r
~--------
r
r~
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
facts will be found admissible. The cause of injuries
(or death in a wrongful death action or in a homicide
case) is just one illustration.
D. ~§QD§~~ v. ~~g§m~D, 704 S.W.2d 656 (Ky.App. 1986): The
~ plain-ti ff ·~t.opped- hi-st .... uck-_aloRgsi de a hi ghway after stri ki ng a
deer. The defendant subsequently came along while the plaintiff
was trying to load the deer carcass into his truck. The
plaintiff"s vehicle was struck by the defendant"s car, causing
~injuries to the plaintiff. At trial a state trooper who had
investigated the accident was allowed to testify that he had
~~lfstea--rmpr--Gper~l':k!-ngof the plaintiff"s vehicle as a factor
contributing to the accident. O~jection was made to this
testimony and overruled.
1. The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence was
equivalent to an expression of opinion that the plaintiff"s
negligence had caused the accident. The Court said that
witnesses may not usurp the function of the jury, which is
another way of describing the ultimate fact rule.
2. The ruling on this evidence was sound. It should not
have been admitted. How would one explain such a decision
without the ultimate fact rule? In most jurisdictions and
under the Federal Rules the test for opinion evidence is aid
to the trier of fact. The testimony in this instance would
not aid the jury for a simple reason: The witness could
describe the location of the plaintiff"s truck in
relationship to the road and could describe other pertinent
circumstances at the scene; the jury could draw the
inference concerning the cause of the accident as easily and
as accurately as the witness did.
~--E~~g1-g~I_Er::S!f!.l§~L~[!!;LQe!.niQ[L~Yig§n~§: The follow i ng
cases present additional diffiCUlty in trying to understand the
scope of expert opinion in Kentucky:
1. E§n~l§tQn v. gQmmQn~§2ltb, 685 S.W.2d 549 (Ky. 1985):
In this case the defendant was convicted of rape and sodomy
of a 6 year old victim. At trial he offered testimony from
a psychologist that his psychological profile was not
consistent with the. profile of a sex offender; he also
wanted to have the expert testify as to the probability of
the de~endant having committed the act. The testimony was
excluded!! a rulilJ9~<£fffirmed by the Supreme Court on this
ground: fI_B!" opini on as to whether the accused had the
ability or propensity to commit such an act is improper
b~use it is an opinion on the ultimate fact, that is,
innocence or guilt. Consequently, it invades the proper
province of the jury." !Q.l!- at 553.
2. Qn~~n v. gQmmQn~§~ltb, 728 S.W.2d 536 (Ky.App. 1987):
In this child abuse case, a social worker was allowed to
testify at trial that the alleged victim of the crime was
upset when interviewed by the witness after the alleged act
A- 13
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and that her behavior was consistent with that of a sexually
abused child. The Court of Appeals concluded that this
testimony did not "go to the ultimate issue of innocence or
guilt", that the social worker was qualified to testify as
she did, and that the testimony was admissible.
i. If there is a difference between the testimony in
these two cases, it is a very fine difference indeed.
In both instances the expert is trying to use what is
known about the behavior of a category of people for an
inference that an alleged act by a specific individual
did or did not occur.
11. It is extremely difficult to see how the testimony
in the first case can be characterized as ultimate fact
testimony while that in the latter case is not.
iii. Once again the "ultimate fact" rule serves to
distract the courts from other considerations which
ought to determine admissibility of opinion testimony.
Is there a scientific basis for the conclusions drawn
by the experts? Is there undue speculation in their
testimony? Could the jurors just as easily draw the
necessary inferences to get to the ultimate conclusion?
And, of course, would the testimony assist the triers
of fact? A more cohesive body of opinion law would
result from consideration of these questions than has
resulted from use of the ultimate fact doctrine.
A. IDi~QQ~£iiQQ: The law has long had two separate privileges
which affect the admissibility of testimony of one spouse when
offered against the other. One of the privileges allows a spouse
to refuse to give any testimony at all against the other; this is
commonly called the "adverse testimony privilege". (In some
jurisdictions this privilege may be invoked not only by the
spouse-witness but also by the spouse-party). The other
privilege is one that protects against the testimonial disclosure
of private communications between spouses during marriage; this
one is commonly called the "confidential commLtnications
pri vi 1ege".
1. The scope of protection from these privileges has been
on the decline since the Supreme Court of the United States
decided in 1980 that the adverse testimony privilege under
federal law could not be invoked by a party-spouse against a
witness-spouse who desired to testify. I~smm~l v. UQii~Q
§isi~§, 445 U.S. 40, 100 S.Ct. 906 (1980). In so ruling the
Court reasoned that in this situation (where a spouse was
willing to voluntarily testify against the other) the
marriage had so deteriorated that loss of relevant evidence
by application of the privilege could not be justified.
2. In recent cases there has been consideration of the
extent to which the privileges should be applied when there
exists a marriage in form but not substance. The cases
described below are representative.
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B. ~Q1~~g_§~e~~§ v. E~lk, 816 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987): In
this case, the spouses were permanently separated at the time of
a communication between them. By the time of trial the marriage
had been terminated. The husband invoked the confidential
communications privilege in an attempt to exclude testimony about
the communication with his former wife. The trial court ruled
the testimony admissible and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. This case is different from the I~emm~l case on an
important point; the earlier case involved the "adverse
testimony privilege" while this one involves the
"confidential communication priVilege". The significance of
this is that the Court in E~lk could not rely on the
deteriorating marriage argument because of the fact that the
communications privilege clearly survives the termination of
the marriage.
2. The Court nevertheless found the testimony unprotected.
It ruled that the privilege in question has always reqUired
a valid marriage as a prerequisite to protecting the
communications and that when the spouses are permanently
separated at the time of the communication there is no
protection of their communications.
C. ~Q1~gg_§~e~~§ v. ~~Lg, 750 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1984): The
situation in this case was much like that involved in the prior
case. There was a confidential communication between spouses
while they were married but in a state of permanent separation.
At trial one spouse was a voluntary witness against the other,
meaning that the only possible protection available to the
party-spouse was under the confidential communications privilege;
the adverse testimony privilege had been rendered unavailable by
the ILemmgl decision. An objection by the party-spouse to the
testimony about the confidential communication between him and
his spouse was overruled at trial. In affirming this ruling the
Court of Appeals made two important decisions.
1. An argument was made in this case by the appellee that
the confidential communication privilege should have no
application whenever one spouse is ready to testify against
the other as to communications made in a deteriorated
marriage. This argument was based upon the reasoning used
in I~emmgl to limit the adverse testimony privilege to the
unwilling party-spouse, namely, that a marriage which had so
-deteriorated that one was willing t.o testify against the
other-~~s not worth saving at the~ost of important
evidence.
i. The cour£r~jected this argument and ruled that the
mere fact that one spouse was willing to reveal
communications made by the other was not reason to
reject the expected protection of the confidential
communications privilege.
A-:l.5
ii. One of the reasons it gave was a fear of getting
into a difficult problem of determining when a marriage
had so deteriorated that communications should no
longer be regarded as confidential.
2. The Court ruled, however, that the communication
privilege did not apply in this situation because the
spouses were permanently separated at the time of the
communication: "[OJnly communications that take place
during a valid marriage between couples still cohabiting
pursuant to that marriage are protected by the privilege.
J
J
J
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D. !n_~~_~!~n~§§_~~iQ~~_§~snQ_~~~~, 791 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1986):
In this case a spouse was called before a grand jury and asked J'
questions about her husband. She refused to answer any questions •
and upon advice of counsel invoked both the adverse testimony and
the confidential communications privilege. A motion was made to
compel her to testify. At a hearing on this motion it was J•.
determined that she had been married for 23 years but had not
lived with her husband for the most recent 11 years. The trial
court nonetheless denied the motion to compel her to testify. .JI
The Court of Appeals reversed.
1. The Court held that the adverse testimony privilege
should not be available even to an unwilling spouse-witness J
unless there is a valid marriage to be protected by denying
access to relevant information. Because the spouses had
been separated for 11 years, there was no such valid •
marriage and the adverse testimony privilege could not be J
invoked. This is an extention of the I~smm~i decision on
the basis of the reasoning of that case that deteriorated j
marriages are not worth protecting at the cost of important J
evidence.
2. In construing the confidential communications branch of J'
the privilege, the trial court had ruled that the priVilege
would be denied on the basis of permanent separation only if
the separation was confirmed by a judicial decree; the court JI
reasoned that a contrary rule would create a difficult issue
of determining the existence of permanent separation. The
Court of Appeal s di sagreed and rul ed otherwi se: "We bel i eve J.
that a court may rely primarily on the duration of the •
couple's estrangement, which is the guiding factor in
determining "permanent separation' and which is usually
clear from the record." !Q.!!. at 238. J
VII. !mQ~s~nm~n~_Qi_~!~n~§§~§:
A. Q~~g§_snQ_ei~QnQl_~§~: The social probl~m of drug and
alcohol abuse seems to have presented an increasing temptation
for lawyers to try to impeach witnesses by showing evidence of
drug or alcohol use. The decisions on admissibility have been
very restrictive so far. The following cases are representative:
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1. YD!~!9_§~s~!§ v. gsffi![QD, 814 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1987):
In this case an attempt was made to impeach a witness by
showing that he had made extensive use of the drug LSD. The
argument for admissibility was that individuals who use
illegal drugs are engaged in a lifestyle of disrespect for
law and are likely to have no compunction about lying under
oath. The evidence was found inadmissible.
r
i. This type of impeachment looks a lot like character
evidence. There is a settled form for impeachingr__~~--.~ _~~ ~~:~~:~m~Iyc::~~c~~: ~~~=:~ce and this would not be
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i i. The Cour"t sai d that evidence that a wi tness has
used illegal drugs may be probative of the witness'
possible inability to recollect and relate and may be
admissible if offered for that purpose if the memory or
mental capacity of the witness is legitimately at
issue. That was not the case here.
2. YD!~!9_§~s~!§ v. ~!EsQ1Q, 804 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1986):
In this case an attempt was made to impeach a witness by
showing that she had had a drinking problem for two years.
The trial court ruled that she could not be impeached solely
on the basis of having a drinking problem. The Court of
Appeals affirmed and stated what seems to be the prevailing
quidelines.
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i. A general trait of intemperance tells nothing about
the witness's testimonial incapacity and will usually
not be admissible.
ii. It is proper, however, to show that a witness was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of
observation of events being litigated or a~ the time
the witness is testifying.
3. gOQ! v. YD!~!9_§~s~!§_!ffiffiig[s~!9D_sD9_~s~~[sl!ls~!QD
§![~!~!, 798 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1986): The witness in this
case was on a drug at the time of giving his testimony. The
opponent attempted to call a pharmacist to impeach the
witness by introducing evidence that the drug in question
created a state of euphoria which could break down
inhibitions. The pharmacist had no opinion as to whether or
not a person on this drug would have inhibitions against
lying. The trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible.
The Court of Appeals affir.ed.
i. The Court state~ the guidelines set out above
concerntog.t.he admissibility of this type of
!i!!peachment evidence •
ii. It concluded, however, that application of these
guidelines gives the trial court discretion which will
not be overturned in the absence of abuse. There was
no abuse in this situation.
A-17
B. ~~nt~l_Illn~aa_Qi_~itn~aa: The admissibility of evidence of
a witness's prior mental illness was considered by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky in the case of gQmmQn~~~ltb v. ~y~~(, 711
S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1986). The witness in this case had been
diagnosed as manic-depressive and had been hospitalized on three
occasions for treatment. The trial judge ruled the testimony of
this prior illness inadmissible. The Court of Appeals reversed.
The Supreme Court reinstated the ruling of the trial court.
1. The Court established a rule which is very much like the
one used with respect to drugs and alcohol abuse: liThe
prior mental treatment of a witness is not relevant as to
credibility of that witness unless it can be demonstrated
that there was a mental deficiency on the part of the
witness, either at the time of the testimony or at the time
of the matter being testified about." IQ~ at 491.
2. The Court also indicated that the trial court will have
discretion in administering this rule and that reversal will
be appropriate only upon a showing of abuse of the exercise
of that discretion.
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ETHICAL AND EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS IN THE ATTORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
WHEN A LAWYER WINDS UP WITH THE SMOKING GUN (OR DOCUMENT)
A) THE ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE
1) For the privilege to be applicable, the attorney must be acting as
an attorney, not as a delivery boy. Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538
(Ky. 1970).
2) The privilege is not applicable to the physical object itself. Thus
the attorney cannot refuse, on the basis of the attorney client
privilege, to comply with a subpoena duces tecum. In re January 1976
Grand Jury (Genson), 534 F.2d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 1976).
3) The privilege is applicable to questions about the source of the
item, if the client gave the item to the attorney. State v. Olwell,
594 P.2d 681, 685 (Wash. 1964).
a) There should be no mention before a petit jury of the fact
that the incriminating item was obtained from defense counsel.
Olwell, Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1986), People
v. Nash, 313 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. 1981). This protects the attorney
client privilege and the client's privilege against
self-incrimination, which is implicated when the act of
production would authenticate the item. Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976), United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984);
State v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 316 (Ariz. 1981).
B-1
b) The privilege is applicable to questions about the location of
the item, if the attorney discovered the item as a result of
information supplied by the client. People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d
46, 52 (Cal. 1981)~ People v. BeIge, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App.Div.
1975) •
c) If the attorney moves the item, or otherwise interferes with
the ability of the state to find it, the attorney-client
privilege as to location may be waived. People v. Meredith, 631
P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981).
4) The privilege is not applicable if the item is received from
someone other than the client. Hitch v. Pima County Superior Court,
708 P.2d 72 (Ariz. 1985)~ Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska
1978) •
B) WHAT IS THE LAWYER'S ETHICAL DUTY WITH RESPECT TO THE ITEM?
1) The Code and Model Rules appear to require lawyers to keep the
client's secret unless there are statutes or court rules requiring
disclosure.
a) DR 4-101(A) requires lawyers to keep confidences and secrets
of the client. A secret is defined as information acquired in the
course of the attorney client relationship that the client has
requested be held confidential or would be embarassing or
detrimental to the client if disclosed. MR 1.6 requires lawyers
to keep confidential all information relating to representation
of the client.
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b) DR 4-101(C) says that a lawyer may reveal confidences or
secrets when permitted under disciplinary rules or required by
law. There is no counterpart in MR 1.6.
c) DR 7-102(A) (4) says that a lawyer shall not conceal that which
he is required by law to reveal; DR 7-109(A) says that a lawyer
shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal
obligation to produce. MR 3.4(a) says that a lawyer shall not
unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document having potential
evidentiary value.
2) Some courts impose an ethical duty to turn over incriminating
evidence to the state even though no statute so requires
a) General duty to turn over the items after inspection. State v.
Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 684-5 (Wash. 1964); Morrell v. State, 575
P.2d 1200, 1210 (Alaska 1978); People v. Superior Court, 41
Crim.L.Rptr. 2198, 2199 (Cal.App. 5/22/87).
b) Duty to turn items over to the state if the lawyer reasonably
believes that the item will be altered or destroyed if returned
to the source. Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 123 (Pa.
1986); Hitch v. Pima County Superior Court, 708 P.2d 72, 78
(Ar i z. 1985).
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3) Criminal Justice Standards (proposed by the Ethics Committee of
the Criminal Justice Section and reported at 29 Crim.L.Rptr. 2465
(1981)
a) A lawyer who receives incriminating physical evidence shall
disclose the location of the evidence or deliver it to law
enforcement authorities only if: 1) required by law or court
order; or 2) the item is contraband or if the item cannot be
retained in a way that does not pose an unreasonable risk of harm
to someone.
b) Unless required to disclose, the lawyer shall return the item
to the source from whom the lawyer received it. The lawyer shall
advise the source of the legal consequences pertaining to
possession or destruction of the item.
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c) A lawyer may receive an item for a period of time during which ~
he a) intends to return it to the owner; b) reasonably fears that J
return of the item will result in its destruction; c) reasonably
fears that return of the item to the source will result in
physical harm to anyone; d) intends to test, examine, inspect or
use the item as part of the client's represen~ation; or e) the
item cannot be returned to the source.
d) If the lawyer discloses the location of the item or delivers
it to law enforcement authorities (or to a third person) he shall
protect the client's interest as best he can.
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Hitch v. Pima County Superior Court, 708 P.2d 72 (Ariz. 1985) misreads
these standards, which it purports to adopt, by saying that the
standards permit disclosure when the lawyer fears that the evidence
may be destroyed if returned to the source.
4) Professor Lefstein's Advice (Evidence in Attorneys Hands, 64
N.Car.L.Rev. 897 (1986) (addenda to the CJS Standards)
a) Do not ever search for or take possession of physical evidence
unless there is a genuine belief that the evidence may be helpful
to the client;
b) If you return the evidence to the source, require that person
to sign a form acknowledging that he has been advised not to
alter or destroy the evidence;
c) Keep evidence in your law office so as not to impede law
enforcement efforts to obtain it by means of a search warrant;
d) Do not be a party to an anonymous return of evidence;
Note that Lefstein and the CJS would require a lawYer to retain
evidence which cannot be returned to the source, for fear of
destruction or because the source is unwilling to take the item back.
Holding evidence in a law office may cause anxiety, since respected
authorities such as Geoffery Hazard speak about a lawyer's duty to
disclose evidence to the prosecution. Law of Lawyering, 1.6. It may be
prudent to obtain an opinion of the Ethics Committee in such a case.
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C) LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
1) Contraband and stolen property must be turned over to the police or
returned to the rightful owner. In re Grand Jury (Genson), 534 F.2d
519 (7th Cir. 1976) 1 In re Ryder, 263 F.Supp. 360 (E.D.Va. 1967),
aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
2) KRS 524.130: Tampering with physical evidence. Class D felony which
requires the state to prove: a) that the lawyer destroyed, altered or
removed physical evidence1 b) which he believed was about to be
produced or used in a judicial proceeding1 c) with intent to impair
its verity or availability.
3) Civil Rule 34.
4) Court order or local rule.
CLIENT PERJURY
A) PREVENTION
1) A lawyer cannot introduce testimony the lawyer knows to be false
and the client should be so informed. Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant
who Proposes Perjury, 6 Hofstra L.Rev. 665, 688 (1978).
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2) If the lawyer reasonably believes the client's story is false, the
lawyer may move to withdraw, though he is not required to do so. DR
2-110 (C) (2), MR 1. 16 (b) (1) •
3) If the lawyer knows the client intends to testify falsely, the
lawyer must advise the client against such testimony and inform him of
the consequences, including the lawyer's duty of disclosure to the
tribunal. ABA Formal Opinion 87-353.
4) What does a lawyer "know" the client intends to commit perjury? DR
7-102(A) (4) and (7), MR 1.2(d), Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. 988
(1986). The Model Rules define "know" as "actual knowledge which may
be inferred from the circumstances." A lawyer should decide that he
"knows" the client is lying when: a) he believes the client is lying;
and b) the facts (including the client's statements) are sufficient to
support this belief beyond a reasonable doubt. Rieger, Client Perjury,
70 Minn.L.Rev. 121, 149 (1985). A lawyer should not conclude that he
"knows" a client is lying on the basis of conjecture or a slight
change in the client's story. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 s.ct. at 1007
(stevens concurring).
5) Ordinarily, a lawyer should assume that the client will heed the
warning described in para. 3 and testify truthfully. ABA 87-353. In
the rare case of an insistent perjurer, the attorney should next move
to withdraw on the ground that he cannot competently represent the
client because of a serious disagreement concerning the presentation
of evidence. DR 2-110(B), MR 1.16(a). If questioned, the lawyer should
tell the judge that he believes the client intends to testify falsely.
ABA 87-353, modifying ABA Informal 1314.
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6) If the court denies the motion to withdraw, the attorney may
attempt to restrict his questioning of the client to matters on which
the client will testify truthfully. ABA 87-353.
7) As a last resort, the lawyer may attempt to prevent the client from
testifying. ABA 87-353, United states v. Henkel, 799 F.2d 369 (7th
Cir. 1986). There is no Constitutional right to commit perjury. This
approach appears problematic, however, because the client's story
would not have been judged perjurious.
~
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8) A lawyer should carefully document his files in any case in which a
client is "persuaded" not to testify. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 J
(3d Cir. 1977).
J
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1) If perjury occurs, the lawyer should first remonstrate with the
client to correct the matter. MR 3.3, Comment 11.
3) The attorney client privilege. The privilege protects the client's
statements about past criminal conduct, but does not protect
communications between lawyer and client where the client's purpose is J
to further a crime or fraud. McCormick, 3d ed., p.229. The crime fraud J:
exception may not coincide exactly with the ethical duty to disclose.
B-8 J
2) If the client will not correct the matter, the lawyer must notify
the court, in camera if possible, of his belief that perjury occurred
•(ABA 87-353 and MR 3.3(b)) and be prepared to "prove" this contention J
if required to do so by the court. Client Perjury at 149. ~
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SUBPOENAS TO ATTORNEYS
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES (sec. 9-2.161(a) of the U.S. Attorney's
Manual, reprinted in 37 Crim.L.Rptr. 2480 (1985)).
1) All reasonable efforts shall be made to obtain information from
alternative sources before issuing a subpoena to a lawyer for
information relating to the representation of a client, unless such
efforts would compromise an investigation.
2) All reasonable efforts shall be made to voluntarily obtain
information from an attorney before issuing a sUbpoena unless such
efforts would compromise an investigation.
3) Approval of the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division
is required.
4) In a criminal case, there must be reasonable grounds to believe
that a crime has been committed and the information sought is
reasonably needed. The subpoena must not be used to obtain peripheral
or speculative information.
5) In a civil case there must be reasonable grounds to believe the
information sought is reasonably necessary to the completion of the
litigation.
6) The reasonable need for the information must outweigh the potential
adverse effects on the attorney client relationship.
B-9
7) Subpoenas shall be narrowly drawn and directed at material
information regarding a limited sUbject matter and shall cover a
reasonably limited period of time.
8) The information sought shall not be privileged.
If a subpoenaed lawyer finds it necessary to file a motion to quash, these
guidelines should be asserted for the proposition that the court, in the
exercize of its discretion, should require the opponent to make a showing
of need and hardship.
THE ATTORNEY CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGES
1) The attorney client privilege does not protect:
a) The identity of the client, except in the rare case in which
the client intended his identity to be confidential and in which
the client's anonymity is relevant to a bona fide attorney client
relationship. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 781 F.2d 238, 241
(2d Cir. 1985)~ Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1970)~
United States v. Hirsch, 40 Crim.L.Rptr. 2125 (9th Cir.
10/27/86), modifying Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.
1960) •
i
J
..J
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-
j
1.b) Fee information. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 781 F.2d 238 I
....
f2d Cir. 1985)~ in re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
c) Statements made in furtherance of a crime or fraud.
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2) The work product privilege is applicable in both criminal and civil
cases. United states v. Nobles, 422 U.s. 225, 95 s.ct. 2160 (1975).
Wolfram at p. 295 says, "The protection precludes discovery through
grand jury questioning, through subpoena or other coercive process or
through attempted questioning at trial."
B-11
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PRINCIPLES OF VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY
THOMAS L. OSBORNE
OSBORNE & HARRIS
117 NORTH FOURTH STREET
PADUCAH, KENTUCKY 42001
INTRODUCTION
We all know trying a case is a matter of personality and
style. What is effective for one lawyer may not be comfortable for
another. Even though personality and execution differ, many trial
lawyers agree on several basic principles that can make a good voir
dire examination. Today, I am going to suggest to you some of those
principles.
PRINCIPLES OF VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
[1] Put Yourself in the Jurors' Shoes. They have been
served by the sheriff with a summons and forced into a court against
their will. The jurors are not familiar with the cour.troom ritual and
do not know what to expect. They are uncomfortable. It is sort of
like church, but you do not know what will happen next. They are
ordered around by the jUdge and bailiff and usually forced to wait.
Then to add insult to injury, they are asked to speak publicy about
C-l
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-personal matters. Jurors often feel they are being cross-examined by
lawyers during voir dire. They are afraid of revealing their feelings
in public. They are afraid of appearing stupid. They are afraid of
i
being rejected. Psychologists say that jurors suffer from "situation- ~
al anxiety." J
.J
There are several consequences of all this fear. First, the
jury may see you as the enemy because you add to their anxiety with
all your questions. Second, the jurors are not going to openly and
freely tell you their innermost personal feelings about the issues.
In a National Jury Project survey, 71% of the jurors surveyed before
trial admitted feeling prejudice against the defense in a criminal
case before the trial started, but only 15% of the jurors admitted any
prejudice during voir dire. Andrews, Mind Control in the Courtroom,
Psychology Today, March 1982, p. 70.
[2] Quit Thinking Like a Lawyer. The jurors are not law-
J
'1
J
yers. They have not been trained to think like lawyers. These non-
lawyers are going to decide your case. These folks are going to apply J
their own ideas, feelings and experiences to your case. Most studies
show that the average juror listens and understands on about an
eighth-grade level. Most importantly, jurors are determined to follow
their own feelings to reach a fair and just verdict.
How do you deal with this situation? It's simple. You stop J
being a lawyer and start being a human being. Never use a legal term.
[If you break this rule, consider defining the term clearly for the
jury). You talk simply. You talk clearly. You show warmth, concern,
C-2
.J
.J
r
r
and compassion for the jurors. You use the "Double-H" principle. Be
humble, be human. You adopt a style of voir dire that is more conver-
sational [i.e., coffee shop but structured] than it is cross-examina-
-_.... --------------
tion.
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Finally and most importantly. you had better like and trust
the jury and the jury system. If you do not. tbey are not going to
like you or trust you. For example, turn the situation around and ask
yourself, "Who can influence and persuade me the most?" Of course, it
is a friend that you like and trust. How did you get to be friends
with this person! Was it because you liked and trusted the person and
toey returned those feelings? This is non-verbal communication, and
it begins with a feeling, an instinct. A lawyer who likes and trusts
juries is off to a flying start at getting the jury to like and trust
him. fj---he can get this start, the channels of communication are open
for persuasion.
[3] Start Voir Dire by Dealing with Jurors' Feelings of
Anxiety. Begin voir dire in a relaxed conversational [i.e., coffee
shop but structured] tone of voice. If you are relaxed and confident
because you are well prepared, this will help the jury to relax through
what is known as mood transference [i.e., compare your mood at the
scene of the accident-with your mood at a yoga lesson]~ You are al-
r~wayS comm-;;icat ing wi th the jury on a conscious and an unconscious
level. You must be aware of the unconscious communication.
Help the jury to relax by dealing with their situational
anxiety, tell them what to expect. Consider this opening:
r
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Good morning and welcome to the courtroom. I know
some of you have never served on a jury before, so,
before I begin, I will tell you a little about what
to expect. As you know, this part of the trial is
jury selection. It is my job to ask you some ques-
tions about this case. For example, I'll ask ques-
tions like, "Do you know any of the parties in the
case?" "Do you know any of the witnesses?" Do you
know any of the lawyers?" I will ask about your
feelings and your attitudes concerning certain
rules of law and certain facts involved in this
particular case. These questions are asked in
order to find out if there is something in your
experiences in life or your feelings about the
issues in this case that would make it difficult
for you to serve as a juror. It is a way for each
of us to get to know one another before the trial
begins.
[4] Get the Jury Involved in Understanding Why You Are
Asking Questions. Step three let the jury know that you cared about
their feelings, but you have not gone far in neutralizing the situa-
tional anxiety that exists. To validate your questioning, you might
follow one of these ideas:
a/ Pick an alert, better educated juror and ask:
Q. Mr. Jones, if you were a party to this case,
would you want a person who was a close rela-
tive of the other party to serve as a juror?
A. No, sir.
Q. Would you think it was fair for a close rela-
tive of your opponent to serve as a juror?
A. No, sir.
Q. So, you can understand why it is my job to
ask some questions of the jury before the
trial begins, can't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Thank you, sir. Now, does everyone on the
jury understand why it is my job to ask these
C-4
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questions? If so, please raise your hand.
[Counsel raises his hand] [If the jurors
raise their hands, you are on your way to a
decent voir dire. You have just asked them
to move physically, and they did. That means
the process of persuasion has already begun]
bl Q. Now, ladies and gentlemen, please assume that
instead of jurors this morning, you are
seated at counsel table with an attorney, and
y(}U are a party to this case, either the
plaintiff [person who brought the suit] or
the defendant [person against whom the suit
was brought). Would you want the opposing
party's close relative on the jury? If your
answer is no, you would not want the opposing
party's close relative on the jury, please
raise your hand. [Counsel raises his hand]
Q. All of you would agree that it would not be
fair for an opposing party's brother, for
example, to sit on the jury, would you not?
If your answer is yes, please raise your
hand. [Counsel raises his hand]
Q. Now, do all of you understand that it is my
job at this point of the trial to ask you
some questions about your relationship to the
parties and about your experiences and atti-
tudes in life? If you understand that re-
sponsibility on my part, please raise your
hand. [Counsel raises his hand]
[If someone is reluctant to raise his hand,
in your friendliest voice, ask, "Mrs. Jones,
I couldn't tell if you agreed with my last
statement. Could you tell me, please?"]
[5] Get the Jury Talking Quickly. The importance of this
principle cannot be overstated. One of the loneliest feelings I know
is standing in a crowded c~urtroom asking jurors questions and getting
not h i ngin ret urn but the " s i 1en t t rea t men 1." Ma ny v0 i r d ire e xam ina -
r tions end at this point with little or no answers. If this happens,
r
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you have received no information and, worse, the jury has been reluc-
c-s
tant to respond to you. Still worse, the jury may have formed a pat-
tern of resisting you and your presentation. Still worse, you may not
I
i
.oJ
want to go to work for your uncle in a coal mine.
Try this:
So, what do you do?
Ladies and gentlemen, as you were being called and
seated in the jury box, I tried to keep up with
where each of you were seated. I have a chart with
each block being one chair. [Holding up the chart
for them] I would like to double check the chart's
accuracy by asking each of you to stand and tell us
your name and where you live. Let's start with the
first juror called and proceed in the same order in
which the clerk called your names. [After the re-
sponse, "Thank you, sir," or "Thank you, ma'am."
Maintain eye contact while thanking the jurors].
Another technique is to begin voir dire with a question to
which the jury is most likely to respond. For example: [1] Do you
drive a car? [2] Have you ever been in an automobile wreck? [3]
Have you ever served on a jury? [4] How many of you served in the
United States Armed Forces?
[6] Show an Interest in the Jurors' Answers. When a juror
is speaking, you must show respect and interest in the person by main-
taining eye contact. After the answer is complete, be ready to do one
of two things. Either thank the juror for his answer, or be ready
with a follow-up question using the juror's words. This is a subtle
form of flattery, and it lets the juror know that you are listening
carefully. Always reinforce the jurors' responses by acknowledging
them.
When people have good rapport with one another, they will
frequently mimic one another's body movements, rhythm of speech, and
C-6
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tone of voice. This phenomenon is called neurolinguistic programming
[NLP] or sometimes pacing. A lawyer working hard during voir dire
examination might naturally emulate a juror's body movements, voice
and rhythm of speech. By moving like the juror with your hands and
developing the juror's rhythm of speech, you will learn how the juror
is feeling. However, this must be done naturally. It will not work
as a technique. A better understanding of this form of communication
can be found in Smith and Malandro, Courtroom Communication Strategies,
(Kluwer, 1985) -- [to order, call (212) 382-2855 and ask for Customer
ServiceJ. In my view, this book represents a great breakthrough in
studying communication principles in the courtroom.
[7J Do Not Ask a Question which May Offend Any Juror. The
-beRt rule to follow here is what we call the "barbecue rule." We have
a lot of barbecues in Western Kentucky, and they are great social
events. Do not ask any question you would not ask someone you just
met at a barbecue. For example, do not say, "Hi, my name is Tom, how
much money do you make?U
Other areas where embarrassment is likely include questions
!~lating to whether one's spouse works outside of the home and prior
litigation experience. For example, do not ask, "Does your wife
work?" Also, do not ask about a juror's prior litigat-ion experience
if you do not feel it is absolutely necessary to inquire about divorce
matters.
A corollary to this principle is progression. Try to orga-
nize your questions so that the least personal questions are asked
C-7
first and the more personal questions are asked later in the conver-
sation. This is consistent with the way a natural conversation pro-
gresses when two people meet.
Never use the words "biased" or "prejudiced." These words
have a bad connotation. Simply design questions to get the infor-
mation you want in an indirect way.
Always pronounce a juror's name correctly. If you are
unsure, ask. In the case of a lady juror, you might ask, "Do you
prefer to be called Ms. or Miss" or in an appropriate case, "Ms. or
Mrs.?"
[8] Have Your Questions Written Verbatim. You should never
read the questions, but writing them forces you to think precisely how
you want to ask each question. Writing your questions also serves
another function. It builds confidence and allows you to relax.
.J
J
ij
You know the jury will probably respond to certain questions. f
.J
You can keep the jury interested and involved by arranging those
questions at intervals throughout the voir dire presentation.
[9] Avoid Boredom! We live in a fast-moving society.
People are accustomed to being entertained. Rarely do people sit and ~
do nothing. If you begin voir dire by asking the first juror the
following questions:
Q. What is your name?
Q. Where do you live?
Q. Are you married?
Q. Do you have any children?
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Q. Where do you work? Etc.
then you move to the next juror:
Q. What is your name?
Q. Where do you live?
~~Q. Are you mar r i ed?
Q. Do you have any children?
Q. Where do you work? Etc.
what will the jury feel? They are going to feel bored. They will
feel as though they will be there all day. They will begin to feel
frustration, and even worse, they will blame you. You can never al-
low this to happen.
In order to avoid this problem, consider mixing the questions
that you ask the panel with the questions that you ask individual
jurors. You might also consider asking some individual questions and
jumping around from juror to juror. For example: "Juror No.1, where
do you live?" "Juror No.6, have you ever been in a wreck?" "Juror
No.7, have you ever served as a juror?" [Of course, you would never
refer to a juror by number]. In this way, the jurors are expecting to
be asked a question at any time, and they are anticipating they may be
asked the next question.
[10] Wateb and Listen How a Juror Answers as· Much as What
Is Said. _~odylanguage is intuitive. You do not have to read a book
on it. If a person is sitting with his arms and legs crossed and has
a frown on his face, you know he is not happy. This is not a diffi-
cult science. Our unconscious minds pick up this information all the
C-9
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time. If you want a book on the subject, the most frequently cited
~
book is Fast, Body Language, (Pocket Books, 1970). You can find this J
book in most any bookstore.
Personally, I have found that eye contact is a very telling
bit of body language. The more a juror looks at me, the better the
rapport with that juror. During voir dire, I am constantly trying to
measure the degree of rapport I have with each particular juror.
Also, the tone of voice and facial expressions are usually more reveal-
~ than what the juror says.
[11] Questions Should Show Fairness. Draft your questions
to show you want a fair jury. This builds your credibility and allows
the jury to trust in you. For example, consider:
Q. Mr. Jones, I understand you have made a claim
for personal injury benefits before. What is
your feeling about personal injury claims?
A. Well, I think they are sometimes proper.
Q. Was that claim resolved to your satisfaction?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was it a jury trial?
A. Oh, no.
Q. I take it you could be a fair juror to both my
client [use your client's name, of course] and
to the defendant in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
J
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[12] You Must Get the Jury Committed on Key Issues. You
simply must identify the key issue or issues in your case. Then you j
must design a question or questions which will be asked each juror
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individually to get a clear, public commitment on this issue. Once
the juror has made his public commitment, he or she is far more likely
to act in conformity with that commitment. For example, if you are
asked at a bar assocation meeting to serve on a committee and you an-
nounce openly that you will serve, you then feel committed to attend
It is just good psychology.r~ t1ie~ m~tl ng- {)-f~--1-hl!t comm itt ee .
Let's suppose that you have a case in which large money dam-
r ages are sought. Consider these questions:
[TO THE PANEL]
r
r
r
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Q. Ladies and gentlemen, the Court will instruct
you that should you find for the plaintiff [use
plaintiff's name], in this case, you will have
to award fair and reasonable compensation for
his injuries. Do all of you feel you can do
this? If so, please raise your hand. [Counsel
raises his hand] [Turning to the court re-
porter and saying, "All jurors raised their
hands." If you have not already briefly ex-
plained the role of the court reporter in the
trial, you should do so].
Q. If you find for the plaintiff [use plaintiff's
name], you will have to consider three areas of
damages. First, you must consider past and
future medical expenses. We expect the evi-
dence in this case to show that our client's
past medical expenses are now $147,000. If you
find this is correct based upon the evidence,
will you award that amount? If so, please
raise your band. [Counsel raises his hand]
Q. If you find for the plaintiff [use plainiiff's
name] and the evidence shows that his future
medical expenses for the rest of his natural
life will exceed $750,000, and you believe this
is correct based upon the evidence, will you
award this amount? If so, please raise your
hand. [Counsel raises his hand]
C-ll
Q. If you find for the plaintiff [use plaintiff's
name], and you are convinced by the evidence
that he can never work again and he could have
earned the minimum wage over his work life ex-
pectancy of some 45 years, and those damages
are in the amount of $328,500, will you award
that amount? If so, please raise your hand.
[Counsel raises his hand]
Q. If you find for the plaintiff [use plaintiff's
name], and you are convinced by the evidence
that he has lost the ability to enjoy his life
and that he will be permanently confined to a
hospital bed and/or wheelchair, will you award
a sum of money which will reasonably compensate
him for this mental and physical suffering? If
so, please raise your hand. [Counsel raises
his hand]
Q. One final question on this point, when you add
all of the damages, the amount of money may be
very large. Mr. Jones, if you find this total
amount is a substantial sum, but it is fair and
reasonable under the evidence, will you award
this amount even though it is a substantial
sum? [Ask this of each juror individually]
Q. Is there anyone on the panel who would be reluc-
tant to award a substantial verdict in this
case simply because it is a large sum of money?
[Again, turn to the court reporter and state
that no hands were raised]
[13] Changing an Attitude. In response to a question about
damages, suppose a juror says, "I think there are too many lawyers,
too many lawsuits, and jury awards are way too much. Things just seem
to be getting out of hand." Consider saying, "Thank you, Mr. Jones,
for your candor. Does anyone else on the panel agree with Mr. Jones'
statement?" Two more jurors raise their hands. Give these jurors a
chance to speak also. Then say, "I agree with all three of you. I
sometimes read about the craziest cases in the newspaper. So, I want
to ask you this question:
I
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Q. Do any of the three of you feel it is the
plaintiff's [use plaintiff's name] fault that
there are too many lawyers?
A. No.
Q. Do any of you feel it is the plaintiff's [use
plaintiff's name] fault that there are too many
lawsuits?
A. No.
Q.. Do any of you feel that it is the plaintiff's
[use plaintiff's name] fault that some juries
seem to return large awards where they are not
justified?
A. No.
Q. Now, even though you have these general feel-
ings about lawyers, lawsuits and awards, if you
were convinced by the end of this case that my
client [use plaintiff's name] was entitled to a
substantial verdict under the law and evidence,
would you still make that award? [Ask each
individual]"
[14] Humanize Your Client and Involve the Jury in His
Plight. Maybe this is the most important single principle of voir
dire. The jury must be impressed that this is not just another case.
It is the only case and the only chance for your client. Never refer
to "my client." Always use his or her name. Show concern for your
client by your questions. Touch your client. Feel your client's
problems. Let that feeling enter into all of your questions. That
concern and compassion for your client is the heart and soul of a per-
sonal injury case.
The client is a unique human being, and the jury must be made
to view the client as such, not just a statistic without spirit or per-
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-sonality. The jury should feel that it is as integral a part of the
case as the client. The jurors will have to render a verdict in a
conflict in which they are not involved, with people they do not know.
They have been taken from their businesses, and their lives are dis-
rupted. How are they involved in this? You must involve them. You
must convey to the jury that your client, much like each of them, suf-
fers from disillusionment, self-doubt, melancholy, and embarrassment.
-You must humanize your client and make him more than just another
plaintiff. This is accomplished with your attitude and formulation of ~
all voir dire questions.
[15] Challenge for Cause. These are precious because you
have so few peremptory challenges. Set them up slowly one small step
at a time. Consider the juror who knows the defendant and speaks to
him when he sees him on the street.
Q. Mr. Jones, you are on friendly terms with Mr.
Defendant, are you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You have talked with Mr. Defendant from time to
time, have you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You would not want to do anything to hurt Mr.
Defendant, would you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Don't you think you would be more comfortable
sitting on a case that did not involve one of
your friends?
A. Yes, sir.
C-14
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Q. And if you were forced to sit on a case involv-
ing one of your friends, even though you tried
to be fair, you might, either consciously or
unconscioUSly, tend to favor your friend, isn't
that correct?
[16] Catch Phrases. Later, in opening statement and closing
argument, you will have planned catch phrases to use. They will be
designed to stick in the jurors' minds. Consider using such phrases
during voir dire. For example, in a product liability case, you may
want to repeat "unreasonably dangerous product" several times to focus
the jury's attention on this concept. In the case of a product that
explodes, you may want to tell the jury it exploded "like a bomb."
In a medical malpractice case, you may want to tell the jury that the
defendant is a good doctor who was only negligent on this one occa-
sion, that is, "he ran a medical stop sign." The list of these catch
phrases is endless, but you should not overlook the opportunity to use
them during voir dire examination.
[17] Ask Your Opponent's Questions. The plaintiff gets an
opportunity to voir dire first. He has the opportunity to take over
and to become the master of ceremonies, so to speak. He can be the
leader for the jury and the source of most information. You may con-
r sider asking defense questions such as:
r
r
r
r
r
Q. Do you feel the plaintiff [use plaintiff's
name} is entitled to a verdict solely because
he f i I ed a sui t ?
Q. We will not ask you for a verdict until we have
proven that the defendant was negligent and we
are entitled to recover compensation.
C-lS
Q. We do not ask for your sympathy. We have had
that. Sympathy is like charity, it is not
deserved. Do you understand that we will only
ask you for a verdict after we have proven the
defendant is liable based upon the evidence?
[18] Admit Your Weak Points. Absolutely nothing can destroy
your credibility more than allowing the defendant to effectively ex-
ploit your weakness. Condition the jury to your weak points, such as
a plaintiff who has a prior conviction:
Q. Ladies and gentlemen, my client, Mr. Smith, was
run over by the defendant's car at an intersec-
tion. That is what this case is about. Mr.
Smith will take the stand and tell you about
the incident. When he does, he will also tell
you that when he was 18 years old, he got into
trouble, and he was convicted of burglary.
Will that fact effect your ability to decide
this case?
You do not care what the answer is. The important fact is that you
have admitted the problem. You have saved your credibility. Also,
you have given the jury a small dose of the problem as a vaccine to
condition them later. If the defendant shouts during cross-examina-
tion, "Isn't it true you are a convicted thief," it is not going to
destroy your case. The jury may well feel, "What's the big deal? We
already know about that."
[19] Late in Voir Dire Examination, Consider a Series of
Several "Yes" Questions. The psychology here is to allow the jury to
feel emotionally and unconsciously that they are in agreement with you
..J
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and your side of the case.
questions of the panel:
For example, you might ask the following
Q. Do you feel the jury system is a fair method
for resolving disputes?
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Q. Do you feel that an injured person has a right
to recover for pain and suffering?
Q. Do you think that it is alright for injured
people to seek money damages?
Q. Do you think you will be able to follow the law
_~--~-B.S the-judge gives it to you?
Q. If you see the evidence as supporting the
plaintiff, can you follow that evidence and
return a verdict for the plaintiff?
Q. If you hear evidence from the plaintiff's
expert that the plaintiff has suffered a
serious injury, can you return a commensurate
dollar award?
Q. Can you be fair to both lawyers and to both par-
ties in deciding this case?
[20] When You Finish Jury Selection, Have a Closing
Prepared. If nothing else, a clear and sincere "thank you" is ade-
quate, but your closing should signal to the jury that you have done
what YQu ~et out to do. You are in control. You are confident. You
are a professional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
David Lineberry Case
Seven-year-oId David Lineberry sustained permanent brain
d~mage in a car wreck on June 4, 1987. David and four of his friends
were being taken to the local high school to participate in a basket-
ball camp at the time of the wreck. David had been picked up by one
of his classmate's father, Glenn Dunnigan. Glenn allowed the boys to
ride in the bed of Glenn's new Ford Ranger pickUp truck.
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As they were traveling to the local high school, an elderly
lady, Marie Hunter, ran a stop sign and hit the truck in the side. As
a result of the impact, the truck rolled over several times, and three
of the boys received severe injuries. The other two boys sustained
less serious injuries. The owner and driver of the pickup truck,
Glenn Dunnigan, was not significantly injured in the wreck.
David Lineberry is still in an intensive care unit at the
Frazier Children's Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky. He is completely
paralyzed from the waist down. He has no control over the function of
his arms. Sometimes his arms move in a spastic motion. David's level
of consciousness varies. In his most alert and conscious state, David
will open his eyes, scream, cry, and lapse back into a complete coma.
He is unable to speak or communicate in any way with his family. His
physicians feel that in his most alert state, his screaming and crying
is produced by an awareness of his physical condition.
Assume this action has been filed in the local circuit court
against three defendants: [1] Marie Hunter for negligence in running
a stop sign; [2] Glenn Dunnigan for negligence in allowing the boys to
ride in the bed of the pickup truck; and [3] Ford Motor Company for
failure to warn the public of the increased risk of severe injury to
people riding in the bed of the truck.
From these facts, it is clear the jury will be required to
answer several questions. Put in their simplest form, they are as
follow:
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[1] Did Marie Hunter fail to exercise ordinary care for the
safety of other persons in the operation of her car, and was such
failure a substantial factor in causing David Lineberry's injuries?
Yes No
------
[2] Did Glenn Dunnigan fail to exercise ordinary care for the
safety of other persons in the operation of his truck, and was such
failure a substantial factor in causing David Lineberry's injuries?
Yes No
------
[3] If you are satisfied from the evidence that in the exer-
cise of ordinary care, Ford Motor Company should have anticipated a
substantial likelihood that persons would ride in the bed of Ford pick-
up trucks and that such conduct is unreasonably dangerous, then it was
the duty of Ford Motor Company to provide such users, including David
Lineberry and Glenn Dunnigan, with a reasonable warning of the danger.
Do you find from the evidence that Ford Motor Company had such a duty?
Yes No
------
[4] If you find two or more of the defendants at fault, you
will determine from the evidence and state what percentage of total
fault was attributable to each defendant. In determining percentages
of fault, you shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each
defendant at fault and the extent of the causal relati~nship between
the conduct and damages claimed.
Marie Hunter: %
Glenn Dunnigan: %
Ford Motor Company: %
TOTAL: 100 %
C-19
[You may put 0% in any blank where you found a defendant
was not at fault in questions 1, 2, or 3.]
[5] If you find for David Lineberry, you will determine from
the evidence and award him a sum or sums of money that will fairly and
reasonably compensate him for the following damages as you believe
from the evidence he has sustained directly by reason of the conduct
of the defendants:
'I
J
.J
J
[a] Reasonable expenses incurred for
hospital and medical services,
medicines and medical supplies:
[b] Reasonable expenses incurred for
hospital and medical services,
medicines and medical supplies
that he will probably incur in
the future:
[c] Permanent impairment of his
power to earn money:
[d] Mental aned physical suffering,
including any such suffering
he will probably endure in the
future:
TOTAL:
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VOIR DIRE
David Lineberry Case
Good morning. I represent David Lineberry. David is seven
years old. Little David was severely brain damaged in a car wreck.
As you can see, David is not with me here today. He is not able to be
here. David is in the intensive care unit at The Frazier Children's
Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky.
I brought this case for David. You may hear David referred
to as the plaintiff. That simply means the person who brought the
suit. The other parties in the suit you will hear referred to as
defendants. That means they are the parties against whom the suit has
been brought. The defendants are Ford Motor Company, Glenn Dunnigan
and Marie Hunter.
On June 4, 1987, David and four of his second grade class-
mates were on their way to basketball camp at Marshall County High
School. They were being taken to the camp by one of the boy's father,
Glenn Dunnigan. Mr. Dunnigan had allowed the boys to ride in the bed
of his new 1987 Ford Ranger pickup truck.
Mr. Dunnigan was traveling south on Kentucky Highway 95
toward the intersection of Kentucky Highway 1422. Mrs. Hunter was
trayeling on Kentucky Highway 1422 toward the same intersection. Mr.
Dunnigan had the right-of-way. Mrs. Hunter had to stop. Mrs. Hunter
failed to see the stop sign, ran into the intersection, and hit the
side of Mr. Dunnigan's truck.
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The truck rolled over causing severe injuries to David
Lineberry. I brought this claim for David against three parties:
First and foremost, Ford Motor Company, for failing to warn the public
that riding in the bed of its trucks increased the risk of severe phy-
sical injury ten times more than riding in the cab of the truck with
the seatbelt fastened; second, Glenn Dunnigan, for allowing the boys
to ride in the bed of the truck; and third, Marie Hunter, for running ~
the stop sign.
As you know, this part of the trial is jury selection. At
this time, it is my job to ask you some questions on David's behalf.
The questions will concern your knowledge of the parties, experiences
with cases such as this, experiences with the legal profession, and
your feelings about some of the legal issues and facts in this case.
The questions I am going to ask are designed to learn if there is
something in your personal experiences or your personal attitudes that
might make it difficult for you to serve as a juror in this particular
case.
Q. Do each of you understand why it is my job to
ask you these questions during the jury selec-
tion process?
Q. Has any member of the panel ever owned a pickup
truck?
Q. Has any member of the panel ever driven a
pickup truck?
Q. Has any member of the panel ever ridden in the
bed of a pickup truck?
Q. Has any member of the panel ever allowed other
persons to ride in the bed of a pickup truck
which he was operating?
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Q. Are you aware that the National Safety Council
has reported that a person riding in the bed of
a pickup truck is ten times more likely to
suffer severe physical injury than a person
riding in the cab with his seatbelt fastened?
Q. Were any of you aware of the National Safety
Council report which I just mentioned?
Q. Iryou_had been aware of the National Safety
Council repo-~t--and the risks involved, would
you have allowed persons to ride in the bed of
a pickup truek whieh you were operating?
Q. Have any of you ever purchased a product that
had a warning on it?
Q. Do you generally try to follow the warnings on
products you purchase?
Q. After reading a warning on a product, are you
more careful in using that product?
Q. Have any of you ever been injured by a danger-
ous or defective product?
Q. Have any of you ever considered filing a pro-
duct liability action?
Q. Have any of you ever represented a plaintiff in
a product liability action?
Q. Have any of you ever represented a defendant in
~preduct liability action?
Q. Have any of you ever written articles concern-
ing product liability eases?
Q. Do you believe a manufacturer should place warn-
ings on dangerous produets?
Q. Do yo~ know any of the parties in this case:
David Lineberry, Glenn Dunnigan or Marie
Hunter?
Q. Have any of you ever worked for Ford Motor
Company?
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Q. Have any of you ever performed legal services
for Ford Motor Company or any other automobile
manufacturer?
Q. Have you or any member of your family or close
friends ever worked for any automobile manufac-
turer?
Q. Have any of you ever owned stock in Ford Motor
Company?
Q. Have any of you ever owned shares of a mutual
fund that may have held stock in Ford Motor
Company?
Q. Have any of you ever served as jurors in a case
before?
Q. Have any of you ever been a party to a lawsuit
other than a divorce?
Q. Have any of you ever testified in a jury trial
as a witness?
Q. Have any of you ever represented a plaintiff in
a personal injury case?
Q. Have any of you ever represented a defendant in
a personal injury case?
Q. Have you or any member of your family ever been
involved in an automobile wreck?
Q. Have you or any member of your family ever made
a claim for personal injury benefits even
though it did not result in a lawsuit?
Q. Have you ever been employed in any job which
required you to adjust and settle claims?
Q. Are any of you members of the Defense Re~earch
Institute?
Q. Are any of you members of any legal organiza-
tion which is designed to advance education and
training regarding the defense of lawsuits?
Q. Earlier, I told you I would ask you about some
of your feelings. One of the things I would
C-24
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like to ask is how you feel about Ralph Nader
and his work as a lawyer?
Q. How do you feel about product liability cases
in general?
Q. How do you feel about awarding money for pain
and suffering?
Q. Do you think there should be caps on pain and
suffering awards?
Q. Have you read recently about the lawsuit cri-
sis?
Q. Do you believe there is a liability lawsuit
crisis in America?
Q. Where have you read about this crisis?
Q. Do you read Time Magazine or Newsweek?
Q. Have you read any of the advertisements about
the so-called lawsuit crisis in Time Magazine
or Newsweek?
[By this point, someone has mentioned insurance,
so, I can go ahead with the subject.]
Q. Do you feel that insurance companies in America
are justified in increasing premiums as a re-
sult of large jury verdicts?
Q. If you find for the plaintiff, David Lineberry,
in this case and you are convinced that he has
incurred $147,000 in medical expenses from the
date of the wreck until the date of trial, will
you award that sum as damages?
Q. Will you be hesitant to award that sum because
it is a J8!ge-attrount of money?
~
Q~ ~r you find for the plaintiff, David Lineberry,
in this case and you are convinced that through-
out his lifetime he is going to require care
and treatment which will cost his family a
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total sum of $750,000, will you award that sum
for future medical expenses?
Q. If you find for the plaintiff, David Lineberry,
in this case and you are convinced that he is
totally and completely disabled as a result of
this wreck, will you award him a fair sum for
the destruction of his power to earn money?
Q. If you find from the evidence that the minimum
award you could make for David Lineberry's
destruction of earning capacity is the minimum
wage of $3.65 per hour multiplied by 45 years
of work life expectancy is $328,500, will you
make an award for that amount?
Q. Assume you find for the plaintiff, David Line-
berry, in this case, do you understand you will
be required to determine an appropriate sum
which will fairly and reasonably compensate him
for the loss of his enjoyment of life and the
mental and physical pain and suffering that he
will endure in the future?
Q. Do you think that you, as a juror, can arrive
at a sum of money which will fairly and reason-
ably compensate David Lineberry for this loss?
Q. Assume you find for the plaintiff, David Line-
berry, in this case and you are convinced that
David Lineberry will never substantially im-
prove from his condition as it exists today, do
you think you could be fair to both David Line-
berry and to Ford Motor Company in arriving at
an appropriate damage figure?
Q. Can you conceive any case where the pain and
suffering damages should be in the sum of
$1,000,000 or more?
Q. Do you realize that there is nothing that will
compensate David Lineberry in any way for his
condition and what has been done to him other
than money?
Q. Do you realize that money may allow David Line-
berry, if he improves to the point of getting
into a wheelchair, to be able possibly to travel,
to take advantage of new medical technology which
C-26
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may develop in the future, and to maybe even
salvage for himself some small measure of enjoy-
ment out of life?
Now I want to ask you some questions about ap-
portionment of liability. If you find one or
more defendants at fault, it will be your job
to determine t~----extent to which their indivi-
dual fault caused David Lineberry's injuries.
For example, if you find against two defend-
ants, do you understand that you will be re-
quired to assign a percentage for each defend-
ant, totaling 100%?
Do you understand that the only negligence we
will prove in this case against the defendant,
Marie Hunter, is her failure to see a stop
sign?
Do you understand that simply is an accident?
Have any of you ever accidentally ran a stop
sign?
On the other hand, do you understand the deci-
sion of Ford Motor Company not to place a
warning on this truck was an intentional act?
Do you, generally, assign more blame to a per-
son for committing an intentional act as op-
posed to an accidental act?
Do any of you have a severely injured or
severely handicapped person in your family?
Do any of you have a close friend who is
severely injured or severely handicapped?
Do any of you know of any reason why you could
not sit in this ease as a juror and be com-
pletely tai--rto both David Lineberry and -to
F~rd/Motor Company and the other defendants?
THANK YOU, GENTLEMEN.
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POSTSCRIPT
This voir dire was written to fit into a 20-minute seminar
program. Since the inidividual defendants in this case had limited
insurance coverage, I felt there were three key issues that must be
dealt with during voir dire examination:
[1] Will the Juror Find Ford Motor Company Liable? The voir
dire attempted to focus immediately upon Ford, taking advantage of the
psychological principle of primacy. Questions were structured to make
Ford appear to be "at fault."
[2] Will the Juror Award Substantial Damages? These issues ~
were dealt with in greater detail than many judges would allow. [How
often do you have three law school professors on a jury panel?]
[3] Will the Juror Apportion Heavily Against Ford? I closed
the voir dire with a preview of my argument as to why Ford is more
responsible than Marie Hunter who simply ran a stop sign. She was
guilty of a simple accident which anyone can understand.
hand, Ford was guilty of an intentional failure to warn.
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RULE 11 UPDATE
Richard H. Underwood
Associate Professor of Law
University of Kentucky
" ••• as a deterrant to ill-founded
prosecution, a law was made imposing
on any accuser, who failed to win
one fifth of the votes, a fine of
1000 drachmae or, in a civil case,
of one-sixth of the sum in dispute."
c. Robinson, A History of Greece
272 (9th ed. 1957) (commentary on
ancient Athenian. law courts).
" ••• I think Rule 11 is a useful
weapon against unnecessary litigation,
and most judges think that too."
Arthur Miller
"It's become another way of harrassing
the opponent and delaying the case ••••
To date, the effects have been adverse."
Judge Jack Weinstein
0-1
I. THE RULE
A. Text:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper «a party ,.,..ented by
an attorney shall be aiped by at leut one attorney « record in his
individual name, whole add~ mall be ltated. A party who is not
npreeented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motioD, or other
paper and ltate his address. Except when otherwise specifically provid·
ed by Nle or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 8CCOIIIpanied by
atraclavit. The Nle in equity that the avennenta of an answer under
oath mlllt be overcome by the testimony of t_ wim- or « one
wime. IUItained by corroborating circumstances is aboIiIIhed. The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extenaion. modification, or reversal of eKisting law,
and that it is not inter.-elf for any improper purpose, sueh as to
harass or to cause unnec:eB8llry delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
Itric:ken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is c:alled to the
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is ligned in violation of this Nle, the court, upon motion or upon
ita own initiative, shall impoee upon the perlOn who ligned it, a
represented party, or both, an approp":.ate sanction, which may include
an order to pay to the other party or partiell the amount of the
reuonable expenMI incurred because of the faling « the pleading,
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(AIIleIlded elf... AIIpIIt I. I_.!
B. Deviation from the traditional ethic?
A code that deals primarily
with the lawyer's conduct in
relation to the client can be
called a loyalty code •••• A
code of ethics that addresses
both [dealings with the client,
and others on behalf of the ,
client) can be called an
integrity code [like Rule II).
L. Ray Patterson. An Inquiry
Into The Nature Of Legal Ethics,
1 Georgetown J. Legal Ethics 47
(1987)
C. Components
1. Objective versus subjective
2. Well grounded in fact
3. Duty with respect to law
4. Not for any improper purpose
5. Motion for fees and expenses
6. Procedure
7. Appropriate sanction 0-2
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II. THE VIEW FROM MOUNT OLYMPUS
The following comments from the federal bench
are worth studying.
A. Schwarzer, Sanctions under the New Federal
Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 184-5
(1985) :
That the threat of sanctions for misuse or abuse may tend somewhat
to inhibit attorneys is not equivalent to ebiJJing vigorous advocacy. Rule
11 in substance requires the signing lawyer or party to certify that on
the basis of a reasonable prefiling inquiry he is informed and believes
that the paper has a factual and legal basis and that it is not interposed
for delay. A lawyer may therefore be caUed on to explain the basis or
purpose of a paper. But vigorous advocacy is not contingent on lawyers
being free to pursue litigation tacties that they cannot justify as legiti-
mate. The lawyer's duty to place his client's interests ahead of an
others presupposes that the lawyer wiU live with the rules that govern
the system. Unlike the polemicist haranguing the public from his
soapbox in the park, the lawyer enjoys the privilege of a professional
license that entitles him to entry into the justice system to· represent his
. client and, in doing so.. to pursue his profession and earn his Jiving. He
is subject to the correlative obligation to comply with the rules and to
conduct himself in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of
that system.
II
A. The Substance of the Amended Rule
The 1983 amendment made significant changes in Rule 11, the most
important of which may be summarized as foUows:
(1) The rule now applies to every paper filed in court, not only
pleadings; and it applies to persons appearing pro Be as well as to
attorneys and parties.
(2) It mandates reasonable prefiJing inquiry-with respect to the facts
and the law on which a paper is based.
(3) It specifies that papers filed must be well grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law or by a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.
(4) It further specifies that papers may not be interposed for any
improper purpose, sueb as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
. needless increase in the cost of litigation.
(5) It directs the court to impose on counselor the client sanctions,
including reasonable expenses which may include reasonable attorney's
fees, for violation of the rule."
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In approaching the analysis of Rule 11, three overriding principles
should be kept in mind:
(1) The rule provides for sanctions, not fee shifting. It is aimed at
deterring and, if necessary, punishing improper conduct rather than
merely compensating the prevailing party. The key to invoking Rule 11,
therefore, is the nature of the conduct of counsel and the parties, not the
outcome.
(2) At the same time, however, the rule, although derived from prece-
dents resting on bad faith, is not so limited. The Advisory Committee
Notes specifically refer to the fact that the "reference in the former text
to wilfulness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action has been deleted.~'
(3) Finally the rule reaches not only frivolous proceedings but also
those which, although not without merit, constitute an abuse of legal
process because brought for an improper purpose such as causing
harassment, unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litiga-
tion. As the Advisory Committee Notes state, the rule "should discour-
age dilatory or abusive tactics and help • • • streamline the litigation
process."
B. The Requirement of Certification
The rule operates by giving effect to the signature of the attorney or
party on a pleading, motion or other paper.IT If the party is represented,
the signature must be that of an attorney, not a firm, who is one of the
attorneys of record for the party. This signature certifies that the paper
conforms to the requirements of the rule.
The person signing the paper may not necessarily be the one respon-
sible for it. An associate in a law firm charged with preparing a paper
for filing may be carrying out the instructions of a partner who made the
decision to fde it. In such a situation, sanctions are more appropriately
imposed on the principal rather than the agent carrying out his orders,
and nothing in the rule bars its application in that manner.
A similar problem may arise when a paper is signed and filed by local
counsel at the direction of out-of-state counsel. Local counsel may be
called on to share in the preparation of a paper and in the decision to file
it. On the other hand, a client may fmd it more economical to place
responsibility on an out-of-state f1l'lll which will use local counsel only as
a conduit for papers and communications. Rule 11 is not intended to
increase the cost of litigation by requiring review of papers by an
additional set of lawyers. What the rule does require is that the lawyer
who elects to sign a paper take responsibility for it, even if that
responsibility is shared. Where control of the litigation rests with other
lawyers, therefore, local counsel may be well advised to let one of those
lawyers sign papers to be fded.
Even if the paper is signed by out-of-state counsel, however, the
presence of the name of local counselor his f1l'lll on the paper raises an
inference that he has authorized or at least concurred in its fding. It
would be difficult for a lawyer to disclaim all responsibility for a paper
bearing his name.II Rule 11 may therefore make it advisable for
attorneys acting as local counsel to consider the extent to which they can
perform the role of a passive conduit consistent with the responsibilities
the rule imposes.
The relationship between lawyers on one side of a ease may create·
problems for the court as well. If the purposes of the rule are to be
served, sanctions proceedings should be directed at the lawyer respon-
sible for the offending paper. The court should therefore identify the
responsible lawyer before such proceedings begin. Where several law-
yers are involved, fairness may require an inquiry to determine their
relative culpability. Such an inquiry creates a risk of generating satel-
lite proceedings and divisiveness among the Ia~ers and should there-
fore be undertaken only in a rare ease and, if poSsible, not until the end
of the ease.
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B. Whittington v. The Ohio River Co.,
__ F.Supp. __ (E.D. Ky. 1987).
Althoulh much fmolous Utiplion iI undoubt-
edly heinl curtailed by the amcaded nale. ita usc
is chillinl vilOl'OUl adVocacy, and the time saved
by deterrinl frivolous Iitiption tends to be oft'set
in hurinl Rule 11 motions. Further, excessive
use of the rule is contrary to the liberal pleadinl
philosophy that is the cornentODe of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which cootemplate de-
velopment of the plaiDtifrl ariPaal a11cptionl by
discovery. nil ooart cautioal that the applica-
tion of Rule 11 Us bcea CMltdoDe anef-1Ome
retrenchmcat ill ia arder. TIte bar mUll become
lanuUar with Rule 11 aDd wat it roquirel, and it
Iw been 100 IIow ia cIoiaa 10. 11liI opiaion is an
effort to provide concrete pidelina to the bar
and thUi make the rule fairer and more e8icicnt
in achimn, ill laudable purpoICI.
A synthesis of the IqialatiYe history, COIIUDeIl-
tary, and cues mala the roIIowinJ Rule 11
principles: (I) AD attorney mUlt read~ peper
before si,ninl it. (2) He mUlt make a reuonable
pro-filin, inYCltiptiOD of the faeta. Tbe COlt of
determiDina wbetber a del'cWaat should be
aamed mUit be borDe by the plaiatift' and his
attorney before the suit is filed; the burden can-
DOl be sbifted to a defeadut to prove bimIeIf out
of the cue after fiIin&. Tbe attol'ae)'l &Ie IIiauId
contain faCtI admiuible ia evidence, • indteatiq
the ~ble aistcaee 01 mdencc. impIicatiDI
that defendant. IUpportiaJ that daiaL (3) He
mUll racarch the law, uIca be iI ccrtaiD be
bowl it. De oourt adviIea all auorae,s to make
sure that the file contaial at Ieut a abIeton
IIlCIDO outliniDl CODCI'CteIy the Icpl buiI I.
every claim • defense. (4) Tbe law u applied to
the faCtI mUit reuoaably wanut the Ieipl poai-
tiona and ate.. be takeL If aiatiDl law does DOt
wanut these ~tioaI, a plauible arpment for
the extension Of the law to the facti of the cue is
required. (5) It mUit be demonstrated, u the
buis of pre-filinl inweitiption and racarch, that
there is a rcuonable buia to DIIDC each defend-
ant named, and to IUpport each claim aaerted.
De lhotaun complaint • 1DIWCr, filed ia the
hope that diIcovery wiD produce the juti&cation
for it. is improper. (6) Tbe adequacy of aD attor-
.Y'I inYCltiption. raearcb. aDd rc.. aaalysis
will be Cftluated by aD objectiveatuclard: wheth-
er the attorney ae:tecl u a reuoaably competent
attorney admitted to fodcral~ Bxccpt u
to improper purpaIC. subjective sood faith is DOt a
defense to Rule 11 IIDClioaa. (7) Tbe attomey
mUll cootinually nevaluate bis, positioal aDd
abandon them if they are DO Joaaer reuonably
wanuted. (8) AD attorney mUll DOt ave aD
improper purpoIC, .a u fwusment or t.timi-
datioa. ill ..miRa uy defendant. uy
IepI position. • tatia& aD1 IeaaI EftA
IDeritarioa litiptioa positions. if takea lor im-
proper putpOIeI. CD ftoIate R* 11. (9) U u
attorney YioIatei R* II, the impoIitioa of IOIIlC
IIDCtion is mandatory, a1tbouP ita .ture and
extent is dilc:rctioaary with the district ooart.
XXI. RULE II's COMPONENTS
A. Objective versus subjective
1. Before the amendments were actually
adopted, one fool observed that the new
culpability standard should be read as a
sUbjective standard with an objective
element. So read, it would ordinarily
apply to reckless conduct. The author
proposed its adoption as an alternative
to the problematical countersuit. Underwood,
Curbing Litigation Abuses (etc.), 56 St.
John's L. Rev. 625 (1982).
2. While this view proved consistent with
many early applications of the new rule,
the cases have tended to shift to a wholly
objective standard (for the purpose of
ascertaining violations).
3. Cases: Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,
780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986); Eastway
Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762
F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
4. Related developments: Haynie v. Ross Gear
Division of TRW, Inc., 799 F.2d 237 (1986)
(28 U.S.C. 1927 applied pursuant to objective
standard), vacated after stipulation of moot-
ness by USSCt. 1987); Hill v. Norfolk and
Western Railway Co. F.2d (7th Cir.
3/16/87) (Appellate Rule 38 incorporates objective
standard).
B. Well grounded in fact
1. Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road
Machinery, 581 F.Supp. 1248 (D. Minn.
(1984) (Client told lawyer injury on Sept.
6, 1977, when in fact Sept 6, 1976. Client's
medical records would have shown truth.
Comment: I thought the statute was an
affirmative defense.)
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2. Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Lawyer for class of plaintiffs had
never talked to representative plaintiff
and had relied on referring counsel to
find one. He had also never worked with
referring counsel before, and asked no
questions. Whopping sanction. Comment:
the opinion has been withdrawn pending
review en banc).
3. It may make a difference if the
opponent controls relevant information
and is non-cooperative. Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (1983
claims involving allegations, later with-
drawn, that commissioner and city improperly
trained and supervised individual defendants.
Training records could not be obtained before
suit.) But compare Albright v. Upjohn Co.,
788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986) (information
needed was in plaintiff's medical records,
specifically the names of pharmaceutical
companies connected with plaintiff.
C. Duty with respect to law
1. Lawyers have an ethical responsibility
to their clients to know the applicable law.
Rule 11 extends this obligation to the court
and opposing party. In some sense this is
not a new obligation. What may (or may not)
be new is the application of an objective
standard.
2. WDistrict courts have held that the
signer's inquiry is not reasonable if the
law is discoverable by using the resources
available to him or her. For example, ~.
failure to use basic legal research tools,
such as citators, digests, and annotated
codes may not constitute reasonable inquiry.
Similarly, failure to conduct a computerized
search, if available to the signer, may not
be reasonable inquiry.w Litigant Responsibility
392 (cited in the NEW ARTICLES section).
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3. The prevailing view is that
the duty to research will be governed
under an objective standard. See
Zaldivar and Eastway.
4. Would a reasonably competent lawyer
believe that the pleading, motion, or other
paper is supported by the law?
If the answer is no, the second
question that must be asked is whether
the lawyer is attempting in good faith
to extend, modify, or reverse the law.
Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.,
771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985)
5. Some courts seem to apply an Objective
test even when they get to the second question.
See Zaldiva.
6. Many courts would like to zap counsel who
misrepresents the law, or fails to disclose
adverse authorities. Other courts have
resisted the use of Rule 11 for this purpose.
Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs
Corporation, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
Compare Jorgenson v. County of volusia, 625
F.Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (which relied
on the lower court opinion in Golden Eagle).
D. Not for any improper purpose
1. This is referred to as the motivational
prong. See Litigant Responsjbilit¥ at 390.
Once again it is stricter than than the
traditional ethic. As Judge Schwarzer
observes:
In considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper pur-
pose, the court need not delve into the attorney's subjective intent. The
record in the ease and all of the surrounding circumstances should afford
an adequate basis for determining whether particular papers or proceed-
ings caused delay that was unnecessary, whether they caused increase in
the cost of litigation that was needless, or whether they lacked any
apparent legitimate purpose. Findings on these points would suffice to
support an inference of an improper purpose. The court can make such
findings guided by its experience in litigation, its knowledge of the
standards of the bar of the court, and its familiarity with the ease before
it, and by reference to the relevant criteria under the Federal Rules such
as those in Rule 1 and Rule 26(bXl).11
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If a reasonably clear
legal justification can be shown for the filing of the paper in question, no
improper purpose can be found and sanctions are inappropriate. In the
absence of such a showing to justify what appears to be a prima facie
unreasonable paper, sanctions may be appropriate.
Improper purpose may be manifested by excessive persistence in
pursuing a claim or defense in the face of repeated adverse rulings,. or by
obdurate resistance out of proportion to the amounts or issues at stake.
For example, sanctions were imposed when plaintiff persisted in prose-
cuting claims after they had been rejected by the court of appeals,"
when plaintiff insisted on relinquishment by defendant of certain rights
as a condition to abandoning a frivolous claim,U and when plaint;iff in
addition to persisting with a baseless claim failed to attend sessions on
time, failed to adhere to stipulations, made a frivolous motion for
reargument, and moved to transfer the action on the eve of the hearing
on defendant's motion to dismiss which had been pending two months.u
2. Of course, this is not really a
problem because a well-founded complaint is
always filed with an objectively proper
purpose? Zaldivar
3. What is an improper purpose? Filing
a pleading to gain time? Chevron USA, Inc.
v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985).
Excessive persistence or obdurate resistance,
as Judge Schwarzer opines?
Motion for fees and expenses
1. Presumably the moving party must
present accurate time records. Cf. Hensley
N. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), Kelle~
v. Metropolitan County Board of Education,
773 F.2d 677, 683-84 (6th Cir. 1985).
2. Duty to mitigate. Schwarzer at 203.
See also, INYST Financial Group, Inc. y.
Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., F.2d (6th
Cir. 3/31/87).
3. The fee awarded may be less that the
"lodestar" (time billed times hourly rate)
Eastway Construction Co. v. City of New
York. __ F.2d (2d Cir. 6/8/87).
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4. A fee request can be so unreasonable
as to be frivolous? Eastwa~ in lower court,
637 F. Supp. 558, 575 (E.O.N.Y 1986).
5. Not every sanctions motion should be filed.
See comments of Arthur Miller at 101 F.R.O. 161,
200 (1983) (discussing bizarre instances of
frivolous sanction motions).
F. Procedure
1. The en banc 11th Circuit recently overruled
an earlier decision by one of its panels to set
guidelines regarding due process and Rule 11
sanctions. The following excerpt is from Vol. 3,
No. 12, of theABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on
~rofessional Conduct, at 199-200:
Di~I'of0pUri0Ir: While a dmJrce action waspeadl"q • .. clieat. tile lawyer &led suit
8nclcr 42~1913, aUegiDa dlat various deCen-
duts ulawrully to apodite the eli-
9OI'Ce proc:eedinp and IenniDate the client'. mar-
ria . The defCftclaata &led mOtions to dismiss
a:fi.or aD award .attorDeYl' feel. The bearina
on the motioa 10 diImia IIliCted to the question
whether tIacR was oy factual buiI for the allo-
ptiona iD the compiaiDL The court ulted the
client. IIer COUDICI, aDd coulllCl'. law partnen to
submit~ &aaDCial statements Cor use if
the court decided to impcllC .nctioas under Rule
JJ. Subsequently, the court treated tile motion to
dilmisl u a motioa for summary judamcnt.
....nted judament for the defenduts, and or-
dered tbat the lawyer pay a SJ.()()() fine and the
defenduts' attameys' feel and apclIICI. -
A ,.ncI or this court correctly revcrMd the
....nua 01 aununary judpllcnL The panel abo
held, bOwcYcr, dlat Ralc JJ procccdiqI arc aimi-
lar to criminal CODtcmpt proc:cediD.- and must
adhere to Fed.R.erial.p. 42(b). This court. ¥O-
tina en bane, _pea aad holds that the pr0ce-
dural due process riabts oIlawyen and clients
who may be subject to sanctions uDder Rule JJ
do DOt require the trial court to adhere iD CYCI'J
instance to R.1e 42(b).
The major .... 01 Rule JJ .arc to rid the
courts or mcritleas litiption and to reduce the
arowUaI QIft and ...rdCnsomeDCII 01 civil liti -
lion. It waald lie counterproduetift if the r:re
_If wen to callie U iDcrcuc iD 81UlClCC11a1'J
litiption by ....tiDa atcnlivc collateral pI'O:
codurea u pnnquiaitel to the im_ition or
aanctioDl. r--
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Due process ~uircs notice and· an opportunity
to be beard before any J<WCmmental dCprivation
of a property merest. There is DO fixed rule to
lovem Rule II cases. The .tandard must be
flexible to ClOVer _ryinl situations. The rule itself
constitutes a rorm or notice to tbe lawyer that be
bas a respollsibility to conduct a reasonable inqui-
rr into the Yiability or a pleadinl berore it is
'1Ined. On the other band, '(uestions or wbether
an attorney made a Iood raltb arlument under
the law or whether he interposed a pleadinl ror
an imJM'O('Cl' purpaIe are more ambiluous and
may require IDCIIC specific notice or the reasons
ror contemplatiq sanctions. If sanctions are pr0-
posed to be imposed 011 a client, d~e process
demaDds more specific DOtice. III either CYCIIt,
early notice or the possibility or Rule II sanctiOlls
.hould be pea to the lawyer or dint - either
by the court, the party seekiDa sanctions. or both
- to deter continuinl YioIations, thereby savina
monetary and judicial raaun:a.
The accused must be ;va an opportunity to
respond, oraDy or in writlnl u may be appropri-
ate, to the invocation or Rule II and to justify his
actions. The rule does not require a Ilearinl
separate rrom trial or other pretrial bearinp.
Wbetber an additional beannl is neceuary de-
pends OIl the nature or the case, includinl the
. tyPe and severity or the sanction under consider-
ation. Further hearings may be unnecessary, ror
cumpie, wben an attorney bas failed to present
factual support ror daims despite several opPor-
tunities to do so. wbereu an issue or credibility or
tbe validity or a lepl al'Sumeat may make addi-
tional beannp desirable.
The impositioa or sanctions in this case is
reversed aJoDl with the lrantina or .ummary
judamenL The dis&rict court should wait util the
motion for summary judlment is properly consid-
ered before decidiD" under the foreaoinl luide-
lines, whether sanc:uons are appropriate and wbat
they should be. - Godbold. J.
COIICIUUn«: The court's ,uide to Rule II is
valuable, but bas DO place in this action because
the complaint &led by the lawyer here is almost a
carbon copy or aD actioD previously authorized by
this courL - Hill, J.
Ct»tcwUIIa: If the Rule I I sanction assumes
the criminal character of a 6Dc. as where it is
IJ'OSSly disproportionate to the lawyer's miscon-
duet, additional due~ safeluarels paralleJ.
inl those in Rule 42(b) are DCCCSI8ry. - John-
101I, Tjoftat, Knviteb. and Hatcbett, JJ.
(DoIIa.... Y. on, No. 15-1170;' CAli '(.
lac), '/~fI7; 'JI6 n. 1570. 1 law.
Mu.PnI.c. 150)
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2. Generally, the courts have recognized
that a fair hearing is required if essential
facts are in dispute. Oliveri v. Thompson,
803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's
counsel unaware that photo's and tapes in
hands of police showed plaintiff lying about
arrest), Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165
(1184 (9th Cir. 1986) (careful scrutiny of
fee request, as well as claim of hardship
by party opposing fee award) 1 Thornton v.
Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1986) (who
should pay ••• lawyer or client), Textor v.
Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1983)
(issue of existence of bad faith/aggravating
circumstances relevant to penalty).
3. When the complaint is "legally· unsound
the cour t may dispense with a hear ing. McT,angb 1 j n
v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir.
1986). Compare Hill v. N & W, supra (no hearing
on Rule 38 motion when apparent from record that
there are factua1 issues).
G. The apprqpriate sanction.
1. The purposes of sanctions are restitution,
punishment, and deterrance. Carlucci v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1985).
2. The courts must realize that they should
impose the least severe sanction adequate to
achieve the purpose. Schwarzer at 201.
3. The range includes private reprimand,
public reprimand, part or all of costs or fees,
and the fine. Referral to disciplinary counsel
is also a possibility. [insert anecdote here]
4. Crippling awards are draconian, and
unnecessary.
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IV. NEW ISSUES
A. Is there a continuing duty to examine the facts?
1. Not under Rule 11. pliveri v. Thompson,
803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986).
2. Yes pursuant to nbad faith n rule? Nemeroff
v. Abelson, 704 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1983). Yes
pursuant to section 1927.
3. Then Rule 11 doesn't apply to removed
actions? tiefwater Real Estate, Inc. v.
ftindale, 7 Fed. R. Servo 3d 56, F. d
(2d Cir. 1987). But Kentucky haS-Rule lr-
as amended.
B. How much of a pleading has to be bad? See
Martinez v. Landau, F.Supp. (N.D. Ind. 10/23/85)
(pleading should be JUdged as a-whole)
C. Are payouts covered by insurance?
D. Is the firm liable?
1. Yes, according to Calloway v. Marvell
Entertainment Group, F.Supp. (S.D.N/Y.
12/23/86) -- --
2. If the firm is vicariously liable
shouldn't it be covered even if the individual
is not? Cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co" 345 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 1984).
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v. IN CLOSING
"If they disregard due proportion
by giving anything what is too
much for it ••• the consequence
is always shipwreck."
Plato
This thought could be used as the battle cry of both
Rule II's advocates and detractors. Presumably neither
will recognize that it is a plea for a balanced view. In
any event, I think that the courts might be a bit more
moderate in the application of the rule.
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APPPENDIX
The most complete service on ethics in general and Rule
11 in particular is the ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on
Professional Conduct. The following case digests of
important cases come from that manual.
Federal appeals court _, IUCbOII law- '
ye'l1lDder Fed.R.App.P. JB. witllout bearing,
for "kina oItjecti,eIy p-.dless legal
arpmeats.
The U.s. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit finds no due process problems
with its decision to impose sanctions, with-
out a hearing, on a lawyer who filed a
frivolous appeal. Rule 38 establishes an ob-jective standard for the imposition of sanc-
tions, the court emphasizes, 10 there is no
need for a hearing in cases such as this one
where the Rule 38 sanctions are premised
on the existence of objectively groundless
legal arguments in the lawyer', appellate
brief.
Dip" 01 OpiniOIl: The plaintiff', a brakeman
fired by the defendant railroad, took his firin, to
arbitration before a IJUblic law board, which
unanimously rejected his claim tbat he had been
fired in violatIOn of the collective bar.ainin.
a,RCment between the railroad and the union.
He then brou,ht suit under 4' USC 153 Fint (q)
to sct aside the board's decision. He IoIt in the
district court and appealed to tbis court. ,
The appeal lias DO merit. 11ICIecd, it reveals a ,
scrioul mlluadcntandin. 01 the scope 01 federal
D-16 ,
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judicial review of arbitration decisions. As has
been uid many times. the question for decision
by a federal court askeel to let aside an arbitra-
tion award is not whether there was any error in
interpretina the contract, but only whether or not
the contract was interpreted.
There remains to be resolved the matter of
unctions. The plaintiers lawyer wasted this
court's time and his adversary's money by misre~
rescntina the standard of federal judicial review
of arbitration decisions. Sanctions should be im-
posed in this cue under Rule 38 for the filina of
an appeal based laraely on frivolousarounds. It is
immaterial that the defendant did not request
unctions, since unctions are frequently imposed
on this court's own initiative.
, ' The imposition of Rule 38 unctions directly on
counsel could be thouaht the imposition or a
disciplinary sanction under fed.R.App.P. 46(c),
which provides for a bearina at counsel's request.
A lawyer orden:d to pay money as a unction for
the filina of a frivolous lawsuit or appeal is
cntitled to due procca of law, aad that entitle-
ment inc:ludes an opportunity for a bearina if a
factual question concernina the propricty of unc:-
tions is raised. But obviously, the riaht to a
bearina, whether that riaht is implicit or, as in
Rule 46(c), cxplicit. is limited to cues in which a
hcarina would usist the court in its dcc:ision.
t
Where, as in this and most Rule 38 cues, the
,conduct that is souaht to be sanctioned consists of
makina objectively aroundless leaal arauments in
briefs filed in this court. there are no issues that a
bcarina could illuminate. All the relevant conduct
is laid out in the briefs themselves; neither the
mental state of the lawyer nor any other factual
issue is pertinent to the imposition of sanc:tions
for such conduct. Where a bearina would be
pointless, it is DOl required.
If there was some question as to whether the
arauments were made ID bad faith there would be
a factual issue and the lawyer would be entitled
to a bearina. The standard for the imposition of
sanctions under Rule 38, however, is an objective
one; it has nothiDato do with the mental state of
the penon sandioncd.
The tCltt of Rule 38, and this court's previous
decisions applyina it, provide all the notice that
an attorney could reasonably demand for sanc-
tions to be imposed on counsel di~ly for the
makina of frivolous lepl arauments in this court
- and imposed without a bearina if there are no
factual questions. - Palner, J.
Dissent: I would find that the appeal was not
frivolous. was .. an .ndue burden upon the
appellee, and WII not a waste of the court's time.
Even were I to consider the appeal to have been
frivolous, I would not impale .nctioas sua sponte
without first al~a the lawyer an opportunity
to respond. - Parsons. J.(HiM ,. Ned.....,W.......... Ceo, No.
~2212; Cot1, 3/16/11)
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Party Meklnc sanctions Fed.R.
ay.p. II .... duty to ..itlcate Ces ....
tllerefore will be compensated .y lor
alllOUftts IleCelSArily expeadeclln respondlnc
to friyolOtlS pleadinc; procedures eDlpIoyed
to ellSUft that imposition 01 Rule II auc-
tions complies with due process Med IIOt
illelude llearing in cases in wIalch oI'eadlng
=
dinc is IIOt Founded in law or 'act and
e Imposlnc aanctioas partidpated in
proceedinc in whieh pleadiq was &led.
Rule II sanctions may not exceed the
amount that the opposing party unavoidably
incurred in expenses and attomeys'rees in
responding to the frivolous pleadings that
triggered the rule, the U.s. Court or Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit holds. This limi-
tation prevents the party seeking the sanc-
tions from abusing the rule by obtaining
avoidable Mself-imposed" expenses.
Dips' 0/OpilfiOtt; The plaintiff filed a breach
of contract action alainst the defendant in June
1983. Two months later, the plaintiff's counsel
cranted the defendant's attorney an iadefinite
extension of time to answer the complaint. After
a I~montb delay, tbe defendant filed its answer
and counterclaim. The plaintiff tben moved to
strike the defendant's answer, counterclaim. and
affirmative defenses. The trial court cranted the
motion to strike. but before its order was entered,
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for insuf-ficiency or service of process and for summary
judgment. The defendant also filed a motion for
recusal of tbe judie. The plaintiff rapooded that
the motions were filed in bad faitb and soulbt an
award of costs and fees under Rule II. The lower
court ruled that sanctions under Rule II should
be imposed personally,on tbe defendant's counsel.
The matter was referred to a malistrate wbo,
after two days of bearinp in wbic:b the attorney
for tbe defendant's trial counsel participated, rec-
ommended sanctions or S14,238.7S. The lower
court adopted tbe recommendation.
The sanctions for the motion to dismiss and
motion for recusal are affirmed. These motions
were not supported in law or in fact. A remand is
required. however, for a redetermination of the
amount or costs and attorneys' fees awarded.
Rule II allows tbe recovery of ~ble ex-
penses incurred because of the filillJ of the plead-
ml, motion, or other paper." In decidillJ wbat
expenses are reasonatile, the court must consider
the coals or the rule, wbic:b are the deterrence
and P'!nishment or ofrenden and the compensa-
tion of their opponents for expenditure or time
and resources respondillJ to unreasonable plead-
iap or motions.
"Reasonable" does not aeceaarily IIlCU actual
expenses. To award costs and fees aDder Rule II,
the court mUlt determine if the expeIIICI were
anavoidable. or if they were self-impoled. When _
counsel is called upoa to defend apiast its adver-
sary's ........bIe motion practices. he mUlt
D-18
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mitiptc damaaea by correIatin, his response, in
terms or an aDd rUDds apended. to the merit
or the cIaima. 1bis reduces the possibility that a
ree petitioner may abuse Rule II to beDefit. rrom
opposill, counsel's CITOI'I.
The delendaat's attorney received due procell
in the impolition or the sanctioal. He wu Jivea
notice or the hearin~ and an opportunity to a-
plain his concIue:t. HII own attorney CI'OlSHum-
Ined plaiatifl"s attorneys reprdin. their _COlts
and (ees charaed, aad he submitted aUll1Cl'OUl
documeats ill support or his positioa.
Altboup the assessment or sanctions uder
Rule II mUll comport with due procca, the
IICCCSIUJ procedures will depend 011 the circum-
stances. A. attorney racin, sanctions under Rule
II is not always .titled to a bearin,. No bearin.
is required wbea aD attorDey is sanctioned tor
filin, rrivolous anotiona unpounded ill law or
ract. and where the jud.e imposin, sanctions ....
participated ill the underlyina proceedinp. TbUl,
the attorney ill this cue received more than the
minimum due proc:css protectioft. - Todd, J.
(lNVSI' Ji'iIIudaI Croup. ... •• ClaelD-NIldeu
S11t,., ... (Ia n Carntt), No. 15-1888; CA6.
3/31/87)
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2. Alternative relief - Rule 8; claims for relief;
3. Unknown Defendants - Rule 4
4. Capacity to sue need not be pleaded - Rule 9
5. Caption - Rule 10
6. Special damages - Rule 9
7. Demand for jUdgment; facts and conclusions--Rule
8. Filing and issuance of process - Rule 3
2.
1.
10. Amount of damages - ad damnum - d9n't set forth
11. Short but state cause
COMPLAINT AND INITIAL DISCOVERY
A. Drafting and Filing Complaint
B. Should discovery documents be served with complaint
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When and how to begin discoveryC.
3. Request for Admissions
!
J
I
oJ
J
1. Depositions vs. Interrogatories
a. Depositions answered by party or witness J
2.
b. Interrogatories answered by attorney
Deposition of who and in what order
b. Doctor
a.
c.
d.
e.
Defendant
Nurses
Witnesses
Manufacturers
J
J
;
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.J
1. Designer
2. Safety Director
3. Safety Tester I
...
f. Distributor
g. Buyer-Seller j
D.
E.
Hardball vs. Easygoing
When to Depose the Opponent
I
.J
1. Rules
-
a. CR 27.01 (prior to commencement of
action)
b. CR 30.01(2) (a) (after commencement of
action)
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c. CR 27.02 (pending appeal)
2. strategy Concepts
a. Simple litigation - as soon as pos-
sible
b. Complex litigation - as soon as prac-
ticable
1. Use of interrogatories prior to
taking deposition
Use of Deposition Dictates the Manner of Its
Taking
1. Rules
a. CR 32.01 (uses of deposition)
2. Strategy Concepts
a. Summary questions
b. Admissions
c. Commitment to a story
d. Completeness
e. Discovery
3 • Is the deposition for discovery or to be
read as evidence?
a. Discovery Depositions - ordinarily
will not be read into evidence in lieu
of oral testimony.
E-J
J
1) Broad scope of discovery - Rule 26.02;
"any matter not privileged which is
relevant to the sUbject matter in-
volved in the pending action ••. not
grounds for objection that the infor-
!
...
I
...
J
mation sought will be inadmissible if
the information sought appears J
reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."
2) Objections are often made for tac-
tical reasons of doubtful
,j
!
.J
propriety. J
b. Evidentiary Depositions - a substitute
for oral testimony.
j
Jdeposition be used in lieu of
oral testimony?
a) some equity cases - alimony
and divorce, foreclosure, J
Under what circumstances may a1)
jUdicial sale, accounting,
settlement of estates; and
other equity cases if the
court so orders after due
i1
J
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b)
c)
2)
E-5
regard to the importance of
demeanor evidence. CR
43.04(1).
witnesses who are exempted
from the duty to present
their testimony in court.
This 1 ist is found in CR
32.01(c) and includes persons
more than 100 miles from the
court, persons in the
military and those who are
prevented from attending
court by virtue of illness,
infirmity or imprisonment.
The list also includes
"occupational exemptions",
notably bank tellers,
lawyers, dentists and
physicians.
by agreement of counsel.
Obj ections as to form are
waived unless made at the
time of taking - CR 32.04(3)
(b) •
3) Obj ections as to substance
(matters of competency and
relevancy) are not waived un-
less the ground for the ob-
jection is one that might
have been obviated if the ob-
jection had been made at the
taking. CR 32.04(3) (a). Ex-
ample of substantive ground
which might have been ob-
viated on timely objection -
qualification of physician to
give an expert opinion.
a) if the case is to be sub-
mitted on depositions (equity
cases - CR 43.04) the sub-
stantive objection must be
made at the time of taking or
in writing prior to submis-
sion.
b) stipulations that obj ections
are reserved
E-6
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matters of substance
matters of form
2.
2.
G.
H.
1.
2.
Content of the Deposition
1. Rules
a. CR 26.02 (scope of discovery)
strategy concepts
a. Chronological order
b. Who, what, where, when, why, how
The Corporate Designee
1. Rules
CR 30.02(5) and (6) (deposing the corporate
designee)
strategy Concepts
a. Detailed notice
b. Detailed request for production of docu-
ments
c. Place of taking
DISCOVERY OF OPPONENT'S EXPERTS
A. The method
1. CR 26.02(4)
Facts known and opinions held ..• acquired or
developed in anticipation of litigation or for
trial, may be obtained only as follows:
II.
r
r
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(a) (i). .interrogatories require. .each
person. .expects to call as an expert witness
at trial, to state the subject matter...and to
state the substance of the facts and opinions. . j
.and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
(ii) upon motion, the court may order fur-
ther discovery by other means.
(b) A party may discover facts known or
opinions held by an expert who has been retained
.J
J
by another party in anticipation of litigation
or preparation for trial and who is not expected
to be called as a witness at trial, only as J
provided in Rule 35.02 or upon a showing of ex-
ceptional circumstances under which it is im- j
practicable for the party seeking discovery to
obtain facts or opinions on the same SUbject by
other means.
j
(c) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i)
the court shall require that the party seeking
discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for
I
time spent in responding to discovery under
paragraphs (4) (a) (ii) and (4) (b) of this Rule;
and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained un-
E-8
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B.
der paragraph (4) (a) (ii) of this Rule the court
may require, and with respect to discovery ob-
tained urider paragraph (4) (b) of this Rule the
court shall require, the party seeking discovery
to pay the other party a fair portion of the
fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the
latter party in obtaining facts and opinions
from the expert.
The matters discoverable
1. CR 26.02(4)--The sUbject matter, the substance of
the facts and opinions, and the grounds there-
fore.
a. Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799 (1961)--
opinions contained in report from expert to
lawyer who retained him not discoverable.
b. Ford Motor Co. v. Angelucci, 455 S.W.2d 528
(1970) --conclusions in an investigation
report of Ford engineering to Ford lawyer
are not discoverable.
c. Ford Motor Co. v. Zipper, 502 S.W.2d 75
(1973) --Both of the above cases decided
prior to 1971 amendments to discovery rules
and their holdings should be examined in
E-9
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d.
that context.
Newsome v. Lowe, Ky. App., 699 S.W.2d 748.
I
i
-
J
j
A. Wh itt ington v. The Oh i 0 River Company, JUdge
Bertelsman 's Opinion sets forth the c r i t e ria for
awarding sanctions, fees and costs.
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•an available seat belt can fall within this definition of "fault"
failure to use a seat belt.
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P.EX;GY E. PUROOM
WELCH & PURIX>M
ASHlAND, KENTOCKY
PRACTICAL cx:>NSIDERATIONS IN cc:»1PARATlVE
FAULT REVISITED
I. ROCENT KENTUCKY CASES
decision of the trial court to exclude evidence relating to
section 1 of the Unifonn Comparative Fault Act (UCFA), which
A. wemyss v. Coleman Ky., 729 S.W. 2d 174 (1987).
1. Facts: Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle struck
from the rear by defendants. The trial court granted plaintiff's
Motion in Limine prohibiting defendants from presenting the
deposition testirrony of a physician testifying that if plaintiff
had used her seat belt, she probably would not have suffered
injuries necessitating medical care. Defendants appealed a
verdict for plaintiff to the court of Appeals, which affirmed the
2. Holding: In an Opinion by Justice !eibson, the Kentucky
SUpreme Court adopted the definition of "fault" contained in
less if a seat belt had been used. Thus, the trial rourt' s
l
refusal to permit such proof to be offered was reversible error.
3. The "seat belt defense" does not qualify as a breach of a
includes an "unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or mitigate
damages. " Per the official corrments to the UCFA, failure to use
and therefore serve to reduce plaintiff's recovery under
c:orrpa.rative fault, upon presentation of competent evidence to
_ -establish that plaintiff's injuries \to1OUld have been substantially
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
statutory duty which may be specifically enumerated in jury
instructions. Rather, it falls within the general duty to
exercise reasonable care for one's own safety.
_ 4. The definition of "fault" in the UCFA approved by the
court probably would also include other types of failures to use
available safety devices which would reasonably be expected to
prevent or reduce injury (i.e. a motorcycle helmet), as \Ell as an
unreasonable failure to follow medical advice or obtain
appropriate medical care.
5. In a separate concurring Opinion, Justice Vance cautioned
that this decision should not be construed by the Bar as an
endorsement of the UCFA and as the court pointed out in Hilen v.
Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984), the Kentucky SUpreme Court did
not and still does not express an opinion on the application of
other portions of the Act, leaving all other issues to be decided
upon a case by case basis.
B. Reda Pump Company v. Finck, Ky. 713 S.W.2d 818 (1986).
1. In accordance with the express provisions of the Kentucky
Products Liability Act, KRS 411.320(3), plaintiff's contributory
negligence is a corrplete defense in a products liability action,
despite dictum to the contrary in Hilen v. Hays. see also
Anderson v. Black & Decker, Inc., 597 F.Supp. 1298 (EDKY. 1984).
2. Definition of "a products liability action" contained in
KRS 411.300(1).
C. Kennedy v. Hageman, Ky. App., 704 S.W.2d 656 (1985).
1. Held that the Doctrine of Last Clear Olance was abolished
with the adoption of canparative fault, per dictum to this effect
F-2
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in the Hilen Opinion. The same language from Hilen quoted with
approval in Kennedy also suggests that willful or wanton \ .
negligence of a defendant can still be offset with plaintiff's.
. t-
simple negligence. caveat: Similar dictum in Hilen regarding
application of comparative fault to products liability actions was
rejected in Reda Pump case.
II. THE UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACf AND PROBLEM AREAS UNDER
CURRENT KENTUCKY JAW
A. Defendant's gross negligence or intentional tort - will
it be apportioned with plaintiff's mere contributory negligence?
1. Traditionally, contributory negligence was not a defense
to "that aggravated type of negligence, approaching intent, which
has been characterized as 'willful,' 'wanton,' or 'reckless'."
First National Insurance Company v. Harris, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 542,
seemingly overruled in Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d at 718.
2. The definition of "fault" in Section l(b) of the UCFA
adopted in wemyss "includes acts or omissions that are in any
measure negligent or reckless," so that one can surmise that any
conduct by defendant short of an intentional tort can be offset by
plaintiff's negligence. The official comnents to the Act indicate
that the coort is not precluded from applying corrparative
negligence in cases of intentional torts, such as certain types of
nuisance actions, but the Act prct>ably would not apply in cases
-involving intentional infliction of personal injury. •
f
B. Third party defendants and/or non-Party defendants - -are
they included in the allocation of fault?
1. Nix v. ~rdan, Ky., 532 S.W.2d 762 (1975). TI«> vehicle
F-3
accident, plaintiff passenger sues only one driver, not naming her
husband, driver of the vehicle in which she was riding, as a
defendant as well. original defendant brings in the husbarrl as a
thi,rd party defendant. Although the Kentucky contribution statute
U<RS 412.030) allows apportionment of fault between "joint
tortfeasors", the original defendant was held responsible for the
entire verdict am could recover by way of contribution against
the other driver for only 50% of the anount paid to plaintiff,
regardless of the respective degrees of fault between the two
drivers.
Section 2 (a) of the UCFA allows aRX>rtionment of fault anong
all tortfeasors, whether plaintiff, defendant, third party
deferxlant, or settling tortfeasor. This portion of the Act was
not expressly approved in Hilen, although later decisions speak
generally of section 2 having been adopted in its entirety (see
e.g., Wemyss v. Coleman, at 178).
3. Given the widespread criticism of Nix v. Jordan, for its
inherent unfairness in depriving a defendant of an allocation of
fault with other joint tortfeasors, it seems lOCJical to predict
that it will be overruled am the provisions of the Act applied.
see Justice Vance's concurring opinion in Fireman's Fund v.
Shennan, Ky., 705 S.W.2d 459, 465 (1968), am Justice Ieibson's
dissent at p. 466.
4. Note that the Act allows for the allocation of fault only
anong parties to the action. Section 2 (a). However, per carlisle
Construction eompany v. Floyd, Ky. App., 727 S.W.2d 867 (1986), a
non-party against whan the plaintiff -has actively asserted a
F-4
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claim" may .be included in the allocation of fault among the
\
parties if requested by one of the defendants. In carlisle,-
plaintiff had settled with an alleged joint tortfeasor prior ito
filing suit.
C. Joint and several liability.
1. Problem: Plaintiff sues tW'O joint tortfeasors and each
defendant is assessed with a percentage of fault. However, one of
the defendants cannot pay its portion of the jUdgment.
2. Per KRS 454.040 (the "apportionment" statute) and Orr v.
Coleman, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 59 (1970), the verdict was "several," and
each defendant paid only his share of the loss. see also
Prudential Life Insurance Corr1p@1y v. Moody, Ky., 696 S.W.2d 503
(1985).
3. Per section 2 (c) of the UCFA, the judgment is "joint and
several. " If a portion of the judgment is uncollectible, section
2 (d), provides that the Court upon appropriate rrotion made not
I1'Ore than one year after jUdgment shall reallocate any
uncollectible amount among the other parties, including the
plaintiff, according to their respective percentages of fault.
see illustrations in official comnents to Section 2. However,
the party whose liability is reallocated is still subject to
contribution and continuing liability on the judgment.
D. "Inm.me" tortfeasors.
1. The negligent employer. Problem: Plaintiff is injured
f
at work on an allegedly defective machine, and brings a third
party action against the manufacturer. '!he manufacturer in turn
names the employer as a third party defendant, seeking iIrlermity
F-5
or contribution, for an independent act of negligence by the
employer, such as failure to repair or service the machine. The
employer counterclaims against the manufacturer for recovery of
N:>rkers I eattpensation benefits paid to the employee. Assume the
employee is not negligent, his damages are $100,000.00 (pain and
suffering and other non-compensation damages), and the jury
allocates fault at 40% to the manufacturer and 60% against the
employer. The employer settled plaintiff IS comp. claim for
$30,000.00.
2. Burrell v. Electric Plant Board, Ky., 676 S.W.2d 231
(1984): Manufacturer has right of indemnity against negligent
employer, but employer's liability is limited to Workers'
Compensation benefits paid or payable.
3. Problem presented if OCFA was applied.
a. Since plaintiff cannot recover fran his employer by
virtue of the employer's inmunity per KRS 342.690, is the
portion of the jUdgment allocated to the employer "uncollectible,"
thus allowing the employee a reallocation under the method used in
the OCFA?
b. As between the manufacturer and the errployer's
subrogation claim for compensation benefits, is there to be a
setoff per section 3 of the OCFA?
E. Contributory negligence of children and others under a
disability•
Skaggs v. Assad, Ky., 712 S.W.2d 947 (1986). The adoption of
carparative negligence has not affected prior law on standards of
care. In Skaggs, a ten-year-old child playing with a BB gun was
F-6
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found to be contributorily negligent.
F. Punitive damages - will any award of punitive damages be
offset by contributory negligence apportioned to plaintiff? \-
No Kentucky cases yet dealing with this issue, but the t
majority view, in both "pure" and "modified" comparative
negligence jurisdictions is that there is no offset. see WOOds,
Comparative Fault, supra, at pp. 174-175.
G. causation - the "substantial factor" test - affected by
the adoption of "pure" comparative negligence?
1. Ashcraft v. Peoples Liberty Bank & Trust Co., Ky. App.,
724 S.W.2d 228 (1987). Affirmed trial courts grant of SUmmary
Judgment to defendant on plaintiff I s claim for personal injuries
resulting fran a slip and fall in an icy parking lot in daylight.
Held that prior Kentucky law on applicable legal duties remains
unchanged by the adoption of cc:mparative negligence.
2. carlotta v. Warner, 601 F.SUpp 749 (EDKY - 1985).
ProfouIX:Uy negligent plaintiff v. slightly negligent defendant.
Plaintiff I s negligence as "sole proximate cause".
3. Prior Kentucky law, that a party's negligence must be a
"substantial factor" in causing injury presumably unchanged by the
adoption of comparative fault. The "substantial factor" test in
Kentucky is that set forth in the Restatement of Torts, 5ecorrl,
section 431 (1965): The actor's negligent conduct is a legal
cause of harm to another if: (a) his conduct is a substantial
- factor in bringing about the harm, am (b) there is no rule 9f law
relieving the actor fran liability because of the manner in "Ihich
his negligence has resulted in the harm.
F-7
4. With the adoption of comparative negligence, Kentucky
juries decide, in answer to a single special interrogatory the
question of whether a party has both breached a legal duty a.nj
tha.t such breach was a substantial factor in causing the harm.
Presumably, the jury can decide that a party was guilty of as
little as 1% causative negligence. How much has to be assessed
against a party to constitute a "substantial factor"? see
carlotta v. warner, supra: "The Doctrine of canparative
Negligence does not mean that plaintiff is entitled to a recovery
in sane anount in every situation in which he can show sane
negligence of the defendant, however slight. If the plaintiff
fails to establish that defendant' s negligent act or omission was
a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff, or if there
was a superseding cause, defendant will not be liable in any
amount." Id., at 751. When can the coort decide the question as
a matter of law (as in carlotta, awarding SWrmary Judgment to
defendant), and when is it a jury question?
5. In cases in which there is a question of causation as
such, it is probably the sole province of the jury. Despite
carlotta •s discussion on causation, the real basis of the court' s
decision seems to be that there was no evidence of a breach of a
legal duty that contributed to cause the harm.
H. wrongful death action.
1. under Kentucky's wrongful Death Statute (KRS 411.130),
the contributory negligence of the decedent has been a canplete
bar to recovery. Since the action is brought by a personal
representative on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries of the
F-8
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decedent, the separate negligence of a beneficiary is also
factored in. There is a question whether the logic of the Reda
~ case would be applied to wrongful death actions as well.\ _If
- the experience of other "pure" canparative negligence r
jurisdictions is followed, it is unlikely that this will occur.
lbwever, in an appropriate case, it is possible that the
negligence of the decedent as well as the separate negligence of a
beneficiary of the decedent can be separately calculated, and
together will reduce the plaintiff t s award.
.-
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1. Rogers & Shaw, A Co!!parative Negligence Checklist to Avoid
Future Urmecesary Litigation, 72 Kentucky law Journal 25.
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75 Kentucky Law Journal 103.
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4. SChwartz v. COmparative Negligence (1974).
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APPENDIX 2
THE UNIFORM COMPARATIVE
FAULTAcr
122:1. IntroductiOD.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act has never been adopted
in its entirety by any jurisdiction. It is however beginning to
exert an inftuence on both statutory and decisional law. Parts of
it have been enacted in several states and in others such 88
Missouri and Kentucky, it has been cited 88 a guideline in the
cases adopting comparative fault. For this reason we are includ-
ing a copy of the Act along with the Commissioners' Comments.
122:2. Test of the act.
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
Section
1. Eft'eet of Contributory Fault.
2. Apportionment of Damages.
3. Set-off.
4. Right of Contribution.
6. Enforcement of Contribution.
6. Eft'eet of Release.
7. Uniformity of Application and Construction.
8. Short Title.
9. Severability.
10. Prospective Eft'eet of Act.
11. Repeal.
Section 1. [Effect of Contributory Fault]
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for
injury or death to person or harm to property, anyeontributory
•
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fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the
amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attrib-
utable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar
recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law the
claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disre-
garded under applicable legal doctrines, lUeb as last clear
chance.
(b) "Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure
negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor
or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The
term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption
of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of
a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable,
and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to
fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault.
COMMENT
J
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-
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This Section atates the &eneral
principle, that a plaintiff', contribu-
tory fault does not bar his recovery
but instead apportions damales ac:-
cording to the proportionate fault or
the parties.
Harms Covered. The apec:ific appli-
cation or that principle, as provided
for in this Act, is confined to physical
harm to penon or property. But it
neceasarily includes colllequential
damages deriving from the physical
harm, auch as doctor', bUla, lOIS or
wages or costa or repair or replace-
ment or property. It does not include
matters lilte economic 1088 resulting
from a tort aucb as negligent misrep-
resentation, or interference with con-
tractual relations or ~urious falae-
hood, or harm to reputation reaulting
from defamation. But failure to in-
clude these harms lpecifically in the
Act is not intended to preclude appli-
cation of the &eneral principle to
them if a court determines that the
common law or the atate would make
the application.
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Conduct Covered. (a) Defendant',
O»nduct. The Act applies to "acta or
omissions that are in any measure
Degllgent or reeklea toward the per-
IOn or property . . • of others." This
includes the traditional action for
Degligence but covers all negligent
conduct, whether it comes within the
traditional negligence action or not. It
includes negligence as a matter or
law, arising from court decision or
criminalltatute. '1D any measure" is
intended to cover all degrees and
kinds or neglipnt conduct without
the need or listing them lpecifically.
In lOme ltates recklea conduct goes
by a dift'erent name. aucb as willful or
wanton miIconduct. The decision
must be made in the particular atate
whether the language UIed is lufIi-
ciently broad for the purpose or if
additional language is needed.
Although Itrict liability is lOme-
times called absolute liability or lia-
bility without fault, it is Itill included.
Strict liability for both abnormally
dangerous activiti. and for products
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beare a Itrong limiJarity to negligence
as a matter of law (negligence per Ie),
aDd the factfi.nder mould have no real
difficulty ill IettiDg percentages or
fault. Putting out a product that is
dangerous to the uaer or the public or
8Dgagm, ill aD activity that is daDpr-
OUI to thoee ill the viciDity iDvo1vee a
meuure or fault that caD be weilbed
aDd compared, even though it iI not
characterized as negligence.
AD action for breach or WarraDt)' is
held to IOUDd lOmetimes iD tort aDd
lOJDetimel ill CODtract. There iI no
iDtent to iIlc1ude in the cove1'8le or
the Act actiODl that are fully contrac-
tual in their Jr8vamen aDd ill which
the plaintiff' is luiDg 101e1y because he
did not recover what he contracted to
receive. The restriction or coverage to
physical harms to person or property
excludes these claims.
The Act does not include inten-
tional torts. Statutes aDd deciBioDl
have not applied the comparative
fault principle to them. But a court
determining that the Reneral princi-
ple should apply at common law to a
cue before it of aD intentional tort is
Dot precluded from that holding by
the Act.
For certain types of torts, luch as
nuiaance, the defendant'. conduct
may be intentional, negligent or aul>
ject to Btrict liability. In the latter
two instances the Act would apply,
but not in a cue in which the defen-
dant intentionally inflicts the injury
on the plaintiff'.
A tort action based on violation or a
It&tute is within the coverage of the
Act if the conduct comes within the
definition or fault aDd unless the It&t-
ute is conBtrued as iDtended to pr0-
vide for recovery or full damage irre-
apective of contributory fault.
(b) Plaintur. Conduct. 'Tault," as
defined in Subeection (b), includes con-
duct of the plaintiff' or other claimant,
as well as a defendant.
"Contributory fault chargeable to
the cleiment" includes legally im-
F-.13
puted fault as iD the\ue. or princi-
pal and .nt aDd or an action for
lOIS of lervicee of a-apouse. It a1Io
coven a mtuation· irl-which fault is
not imputed but would Btill have
barred recovery prior to puuge or
the Act,.-..u, for uample, a 1tTODgful-
death don iD which the clecedent'l
CODtributory negligence 1rOuld have
barred recovery even though it was
not imputed to the perlOn bringing
the action.
Contributory fault dimini,bes re-
covery whether it was previously a
bar or not, u, for uample, iD the
cue or ordinary contributory negli-
Rence in aD action baaed on Btrict
liability or recklessness. Last dear
chance is upreuly included with its
variatioDl.
"Assumption or risk" is a term with
a number of dilI'erentm~n1y
one of which is "'fault" within the
meaning or thia Act. This is the case
of unreasonable auumption of risk,
which might be likened to deliberate
contributory negligence aDd means
that the conduct must have been vol-
UDtary aDd with knowledge or the
danger. A. UIed in this Act, the term
does not include the meaniDp (1) of a
valid and enforceable consent (which
is treated like other contracts), (2) of a
lack of violation of duty by the defen-
dant (u in the failure of a landowner
to warn a liceDBee of a patent danger
on the premises), or (3) or a reason-
able assumption of risk (which is not
fault and should not have the effect of
barring recovery).
"Misuse or a product" is a term a1Io
with leveral meanings. The meaning
in this Section is confined to a misuse
living rile to a danger that could
have been reasonably anticipated and
lUUded against. The Act does not
apply to a misuse living rile to a
danger that could not reasonably
have been anticipated and guarded
aga.iD8t by the manufacturer, 10 that
the product was therefore not defec-
tive or unreasonably d8.ngerous.
f
Section 2. [Apportionment of Damages]
(a) In all actions involving fault of more than one party to the
action, including third-party defendants and persons who 4ave
been released under Section 6, the court, unless otherwise
~eed by &!l parti~, shall ~struct the jury to answer special
mterrogatones or, if there 18 no jury, Ihall make findings
indicating: '
The doctrine of avoidable COMe-
quencee II upNIIly included in the
coverage.
Oauation. For the conduct ltigma-
tiled as fault to have any eft'ect under
the provisions of tbia Act it must
have bad an adequate cauul relation
to the c'aSmlnt', damage. This in-
cludes the rul. of both cauee in fact
and prozimate cauee.
"lJUury attributable to the claim-
ant', contributory fault" refen to the
requirement of a cauae! relation for
the particular damage. Thus, Degli-
pIlt failure to faten a leat belt
would diminish recovery only for
damages in which the lack of a ..t-
belt restraint played a pert, and DOt,
for uample, to the damage to the car.
A Iimilar rule applies to a defen·
dant', fault; a physician, for uample,
Degligently letting a broken arm, is
Dot liable for other iDjuries received
in an automobile accident.
1978 AdditioD to Comment: Adap-
tation of the Act to Moditied Form of
Comparative NBgligence. If a ltate
DOW using the modified form of com·
parative Degligence 'hould decide that
in the light of ita experience it is
wedded to that form and Dot willing
to change to the pure form, the Act
may be adopted for tbia purpose, as
indicated below, by adding the words
in italics:
SectiOD 1. [Etrect of CoDtributoJ')'
Fault]
(a) In an action baled on fault leek-
ing to recover damages for iDjury or
death to penon or harm to property,
any contributory fault cbarpable to
the Claimant, U Dot ,.,..te, than the
combined fault of II1l ofbe, parties to
the claim, Including third-party defen·
cIaotB and pelWODI N1eued under Sec-
tion 6, diminl,bes proportionately the
amount awarded as compenaatory
damape for an iDjury attributable to
the Clilmant', contributory fault, but
dOlI Dot bar recovery. Tbia rule ap-
plies whether or Dot under prior law
the claimAnt', contributory fault con-
mtuted a defeDie or was cliaregarded
under applicable legal doctrines, IlUch
as last clear chance.
(b) Wbenever both parties to a
cWm and counterclaim bave ....
tained damage caWJed by fault or
both, each party can I8COver from the
other in proportion to their relative
fault in accordance with Section 8,
nprd]ess of wbose fault J8 the
,.,.ter.
(c) "Fault" includes acts or omi&-
lions that are in any measure negli·
pnt or reckless toward the penon or
property of the actor or othen. or
that ,ubject a penon to Itrict tort
liability. The term alao includes
breach of warranty, unnasonable as-
,umption of risk not constituting and
enforceable express coDlent, measure
of a product for which the defendant
otherwile would be liable, and unrea·
IOnable failure to avoid an iDjury or
to mitigate damages. Legal requ.ir&
menta of cauae! relation apply both to
fault as the besis for liability and to
contributory fault.
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COMMENT
(1) the amount of damages each claiman\ would be enti-
tled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded; and
(2) the percentage of the total fault of all ror the parties to
each claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant,
third-party defendant, and person who has been released
from liability ~der Section 6. For this purpose the court
may determine that two or more persons are to be treated
as a single party.
(b) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact
shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at
fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct
and the damages claimed.
(c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each
claimant in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduc-
tion under Section 6, and enter judgment against each party
liable on the basis of rules of joint-and-several liability. For
purposes of contribution under Sections 4 and 6, the court also
shall determine and state in the judgment each Party's equitable
share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the
respective percentages of fault. .
(d) Upon motion made not later than [one year] after judg-
ment is entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of
a party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from
that party, and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among
the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to
their respective percentages of fault. The party whose liability is
reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any
continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
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Parties. It ill assumed that the state
procedure provides for bringing in
third-party defendants as parties. If
Dot, the procedural statutes or rules
may need to be amended to permit it,
at least for purposes of contribution.
The limitation to parties to the ac-
tion means ignoring other persons
who may have been at fault with
regard to the particular injury but
who have not been joined as parties.
Thill ill a deliberate decillion. It cannot
F-1S
be told with certainty whether that
person was actually at fault or what
amount of fault mould be attributed
to him, or whether he will ever be
lued, or whether the statute of limita-
tions will run on him, etc. An attempt
to settle these matters in a auit to
which he is Dot a party would not be
binding on him. Both plaintiB' and
defendants will have .igni1icant incen-
tive for joining av8ilable defendants
t .
who may be liable. The more parties
Joined whOle fault contributed to the
bUury, the amaner the percentage of
fault allocated to each of the other
parties, whether plaintift' or deren-
cJanl
III IituatioDi IUCh .. that of priAci-
pel and 8pDt, driver and owner of a
car, or manufacturer and retailer of a
product, the court may under appro-
priate cireumltanc.lnd that the two
perIODi Ihould be treated .. a IiDIle
party for purpoeee of allocating fault.PeJ'ClUJ"'" 01 Ault. III comparing
the fault of the leVeral pert.iee for the
purpoee of obta.iniDg percentages
there are a number of implications
ariaiDI from the concept of faull The
conduct of the cl.imant or of any
defendant may be more or lees at
fault, depencliDg upon all the circum-
ItaDcee iIlclucliDg lUeb matters as (1)
whether the conduct was mere inad-
vertence or eDgegec! ill with an
awareness of the danger involved, (2)
the magnitude of the risk created by
the conduct, inclucliDg the number of
penoDi enc1eDgered and the potential
ItriOUSDe18 of the bUury, (8) the Iig-
Dificance of what the actor was leek-
ing to attain by his conduct, (4) the
actor', IUperior or inferior capacities,
and (5) the particular circumltences,
lUeb as the uiltence of an emergenC)'
requiring a huty decilion.
A rule of law that a particular
defendant owes e higher degree of
care (u in the caae of a common
carrier of puaeDgen) or a 1eIIer de-
pee of care (as in the caae of an
automobile hOlt in a ltate haviDI a
ftlid automobile-cuest ltatute) or that
no necliaence • required (as in the
cue of conductiDg blutiDg operationa
in an urban ~) II important in
determining whether he is liable at
all. If the liability· baa been 18ta~
liIhed, however, the rule itlelf does
not playa part in detenniDiDg the
relative proportion of fault of thiI
party in comparison with the others.
But the poliC)' behind the rule may be
quite important. An error in driviDI
F-16
on the part of a buB driver with a
load of puaenpn may properly p~
duce an evaluation of peater fault
than the lUDe error on the part of a
hoUMWife IJ'8tuitoully living her
neighbor a ride to the lhoppiDg cen-
ter; and an automobile manufacturer
puttiDg aut a car with a cracbd
brake cylinder !D81, eYeD in the &b-
Itnet of proof of neclilenet in falliDg
to diIcover the crack. properly be held
to a peater meuure of fault that
another manufacturer producing a
mecbaDical pencil with a defective
cJaap that due care would have diacov-
erecl.
III determining the relative fault of
the parties. the fact.lnder will alao
live CODIideration to the relative
dOlen... of the cauaal relatioDlhip of
the negligent conduct of the defen-
dants and the harm to the plaintift'.
Degrees of fault and proximity of cau-
ution are inutricably mized, .. a
Itudy of 1aat dear chance indicates,
and that common law doctrine has
been ablorbed in thia Act. Thia posi-
tion baa been followed under ltatutes
making no tpeclfic provWon for it.
Joint aDd Several Lilability aDd Eq-
uitable Sbarets 01 tile Obligation. The
common law rule of joiDt-and4tveral
liability of joint tortfeuon continues
to apply under thia Act. Thia • true
whether the claimant wu contributo-
rily negliaence or not. The plaintifF
can recover the total amount. of his
judgment .,.m.t aDy 4efendant who
• liable.
The judgment for each cl·imant
a1Io Itta forth, however, the equitable
ahare of the total obliaation to the
claimant for each party, hued on his
I8tablilhed percentage of fault. This
indicates the amount that each party
Ihould eventually be ~Dlible for
.. a Nlult of the rules of contribu-
tion. Stated ill the judgment itlelf, it
makes the information available to
the parties and will normally be •
buil for contribution without the
need for a court order ariaiDg from
motion or _parate .ct!on.
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Section 8. [Set-off]
A claim and counterclaim shall not be set oft' against each
other, except by agreement of both parties. On motion, however,
the court~ if it finds that the obligation of either party is likely
to be uncollectible, may order that both parties make payment
into court for distribution. The court shall distribute the funds
received and declare obligations discharged as if the payment
into court by either party had been a payment to the other
party and any distribution of those funds bac~ to the party
making payment had been a payment to him by tlie other party.
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Beal1ocaUon. Reallocation of the eq.
uitable lhare of the obligation of a
party takes place when his share is
uncollectible. Reallocation takes place
among all parties at fault. TbiI in-
cludes a c)ajm1nt who Sa contributo-
rily at fault. It avoids the unfairn..
both 0( the common law rule 0( joint-
and..everalliability, which would cut
the total risk 0( uncollectibility upon
the 80lvent defendants, and 0( a rule
abolishing joint-andofleveraJ liability,
which would cut the total risk 0(
uncollectibility upon the clajmant.
Control by the court. The total 0(
the leveral percentages of fault for
the plaintift' and all defendants, as
found in the lpecial interrogatories,
should add up to 100%. Whether the
court will inform the jury of this will
depend upon the local practice.
The court Ihould be able to esercise
any usual powen under existing law
0( letting aside or modifying a verdict
if it is internally inconsistent or
shows bias or prejudice, etc. On the
aame basis as the remittitur principle,
a court might indicate its intent to let
aside a percentage allocation unless
the parties agreed to a somewhat dif·
ferent one.
DlustraUon No.1. (Simple 2-party lit-
uation).
A lUes B. A'I damages are $10,000.
A is found 40% at fault.
B is found 60% at fault.
A recoven judgmeJtt for $6,000.
DlustraUon No. R. <Multiple-party lit-
uation).
A lUes B, C and D. A'I damages are
'10,000.
A is found~ at fault.
B is found 30% at fault.
C is found 30% at fault.
D is found 0% at fault.
A is awarded judgment jointly and
leverally qainst B • C for $6,000.
The court alao states in the judgment
the equitable share of the obligation
0( each party:
A'I equitable lhare is 14,000 (40%
0( $10,000).
B'I equitable share is $3,000 (30%
of $10,000).
C'I equitable lhare is $3,000 (30%
of $10,000).
DlustraUon No.8. <Reallocation com·
putation under Subsection (d».
Same facts as in IDustration No.2.
On proper motion to the court, C
shows that B'B lhare is uncollectible.
The court orden that B'I equitable
lhare be reallocated between A and C.
The court orden that B's equitable
Ihare be allocated between Aand C.
A's equitable lhare is increased by
$1,714 (.y, of $3,000).
C's equitable Ihare is increased by
$1,286 (¥1 of $3,000).
COMMENT
A let.-o!' iIlvolV81 a IiDgle claim and
counterclaim. If there are multiple
defendant.. .pent.e .t-oJr. llluee
may aNe between a cl.fm·nt and
each or Ieftra1 defendant., but each
Iet-oI' would be a .parate line, de-
termined iDdependently or the others.
The MlDe principle app1iel ill cue or
a c::ro-daim 8Ubject to a counter·
claim.
Whether the rule II for or apinIt
1et-oI', if it abould be applied caf.elori·
cally to all Iltuations it would ~
duce unfair ~ultl ill lOme or them.
In attaiDing a fair application to a
particular factuallituation, CODIidera·
tion needa to be liven to the circum·
Mancee of whether each party .. able
to pay his obligation and whether the
payment comes from his own pocket
or from liability inaurance covering
him. The provisiona of this Section
provide a fair IOlution to each litua·
tion, u illustrated below.
DlU6tration No.4. (Parties fully cov·
ered by liability inaurance.) A .u. B.
B counterclaims. Each II found to
have lIUfI'ered '100,000 ill damage.
Each is fully covered by liability ill·
•urance. A is found 30% at fault. B is
found 70% at fault. Under the ltatu-
tory provision there is no eet-otr u-
cept by agreement of the parties, and
it would not be ill their best interests
here to agree to a let-ofF. A recovers
'70,000 from B, and B recovers tao"
OOOfromA.
DlU6tratIon No.8. (No inaurance
but both parties able to pay judi·
menta.) The aame facti u in IDUltra·
tion 4, but there is no liability inaur·
ance. Each :. able to pay the judi·
ment egainat him. If the parties do
not agree to a 8et-oJr, A receiV81 '70,-
000 from B, and B receiV81 tao,OOO
from A. For their own convenience
they may find it aimpler to agree on •
Iet-ofF, with A nceiving $40,000 from
B.
DlwtnatIon No.6. (No inaurance; B
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II able to pay and A II not.) At, in
IDustration 4, each perth hu '100,-
000 damapa, A is 30% at fault and B
II 70% at fault. Neither party hu
liability inaurance C09WIP. B movel
the court to require both parties to
make payment iIlto court for distribu-
tion. FindiDg it likely that A'. obljp·
tion will be IUlcoDectible the court
iIIues the order. B paYl into court
'70.000; A can pay nothing. The court
diltributel t40,OOO to A and tao,OOO
beck to B. This II treated .. if B bad
directly paid A '70,000 and A bad
directly paid B tso,OOO and the obli-
ptiona or both parties are utiD-
pilhed.
DlU6tratIon No.7. (A hu inaurance;
B does not and is UDable to pay.) The
MlDe facti u ill IDUitration 6, but B
hu no inaurance and cannot pay,
whlle A hu full liability inaurance.
A'. motion that both parties pay iIlto
court is IfBDted. A'. inaurance com·
peny paYi tso,OOO. A paYi nothing.
The court distributes the tao,OOO to
A. This utinguiahes the liability of A
and his insurance company under the
liability coverage, and B'. liability to
A reduced from '70,000 to $40,000.
For application or any UDinaured-mo-
toJilt coverage contained in A'. inaur-
ance policy, the court'. delivery of the
tso.OOO to A is treated .. • direct
payment by B to A.
Dlustration No.8. (Both parti.
have inadequate inaurance coverage
and no other available funds.)
A II SO% negligent, hu damages of
$50,000 and carries liability insurance
or '20,000. B is 70% negligent, hu
damages of,l00.000 and carries lia-
bility insurance or tso,OOO.
A therefore owes B t30,OOO and hu
a claim againlt B or t35,OOO; and B
owes A $35,000 and hu a claim
against A of '30.000.
On IfBDtmc or a motion to pay into
court, A'. carrier paYl '20,000 which
is initially allocated to B u payment
.J
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Section 4. [Right of Contribution]
(a) A right of contribution exists between or among two or
more persons who are jointly and severally liable upon the same
indivisible claim for the same injury, death, or harm, whether or
not judgment has been recovered against all or any of them. It
may be enforced either in the original action or by a separate
action brought for that purpose. The basis for contribution is
each person's equitable share of the obligation, including the
equitable share of a claimant at fault, as determined in accor-
dance with the provisions of Section 2. r
(b) Contribution is available to a person ~bo enters into a
r
r
r
r -.
r
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to him of 120,000 and reduces A's
debt to B to 110,000 and
B's carrier pays $30,000, which is
initially allocated to A as payment to
him or $30,000 and reduces B'I debt
to A to 15,000.
The court now reallocates to B 110,-
000 from A'I initial allocation or 130,-
000, leaving 120,000 for A. It alao
reallocates to A 15,000 from B'I ini-
tial allocation of 120,000, leaving 116,-
000 for B.
A is thus entitled to the 120,000
remaining in the initial allocation,
plus 15,000 from the lubsequent allo-
cation, making a total of 125,000; and
B is entitled to the 116,000 remain-
ing in the initial allocation, plus 110,-
000 from the subsequent allocation,
making a total of $25,000.
Of the $50,000 paid in, A receives
125,000 and B receives 125,000. All
obligations are discharged.
For a complex illustration like No.
8, the process of tracking literally the
language of the Section is IOmewhat
laborious and difficult to work out.
Fortunately, it is possible to reach
exactly the same result much more
limply and easily by using the for-
mula, D - C-O + P to determine
the amount each claimant is entitled
to receive. D signifies the amount to
be distributed to the particular claim-
ant from the funds paid into court; C
lignifies the amount of his claim after
\
it has been reduced by the court be-
cause of hie 9WI1 negligence; 0 ligni-
fies the amount that he is found by
the court to owe to the other party;
and P lignifies the amount that he
has paid into court.
Vie or this formula in each of illua-
trations above will nach uact1y the
same result as that which illtated in
the illustration. Thus, in Dlustration
8, the formula D - C - 0 + P
operates like this: For A: 135,()()().$30,-
000 + 120,000 - 125,000. For B:
130,000 - 135,000 + 130,000 - 125,-
000.
Observe that if use of the formula
produces a negative number for ODe
or the two parties, it corresponds with
a number larger by that figure than
the amount of deposit with the court
and indicates that the party with the
negative figure continues to owe that
amount to the other party. This oc-
curs, for example, in Dlustration No.
7.
The system for distributing the
funds outlined by the section is not
the only one that could be utilized but
it appears to be the fairest and moet
equitable. It gives due consideration
to the relative amounts owed by each
party and the relative amounts paid
by each; and their relative fault is of
course already taken into considera-
tion in determining the amounts of
their enforceable claims.
lettlement with a claimant only (1) if the liability of the pel'8On
against whom contribution is sought has been extinguished and
(2) to the extent that the amount paid in eettlement was reason-
able.
COMMENT
J
J
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Section I. [Enforcement of Contribution]
(a) If the proportionate fault of the parties to a claim for
contribution has been established previously by the court, as
provided by Section 2, a party paying more than his equitable
share of the obligation, upon motion, may recover judgment for
contribution.
(b) If the proportionate fault of the parties to the claim for
contribution has not been established by the court, contribution
may be enforced in a leparate action, whether or not a judgment
has been rendered against either the person seeking contribu-
tion or the person from whom contribution is being sought.
(c) If a judgment has been rendered, the action for contribu-
tion must be commenced within [one year] after the judgment
becomes final. If no judgment has been rendered, the person
bringing the action for contribution either must have (1) dis-
charged by payment the common liability within the period of
the statute of limitations applicable to the claimant's right of
SectioDi 4, & and 6 are upectec1 to
replace the Uniform Qtntribution
Among Tortteuon Act (1955) in a
ltate following the principle or com-
parative fault. The three 1eCti0Dl,
however, apply whether the plaintUr
was contributorily at fault or not.
Section 4 is in pneral accord with
the provilioDl or the 1955 Uniform
Act, but the telt for determining the
measure of contribution and thUl 86-
tablishiDg the ultimate I'8lponsibility
is no longer on a pro rata basis. In-
Itead, it is on a basis or proportionate
fault determined in accordance with
the provilioDl of Section 2. A plaintUr
who is contributorily at fault also
ahares in the proportionate nIpoDli-
bility.
JoinkDd-leVeralliability under the
common law meana that each defen-
dant contributlnl to the llUDe harm is
liable to him for the whole amount of
the recoverable c1amape. This II not
changed by the Act. Between the de-
fendante thelDlelves, however, the a~
portioDlDent is in accordance with the
equitable ahareI or the obligation, as
established under Section 2.
If the defendante cauae .parate
harms or if the harm iI found to be
divisible on a reuonable basis, how-
ever, the liability may become ~ral
for a particular harm, and contribu-
tion is not appropriate. See Restate-
ment (Second) of Torte I433A (1965).
...
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action against him and commenced the action for contribution
within [one year] after payment, or (2) agreed while action was
pending to discharge the common liability ana, within [one year]
after the agreement, have paid the liability and commenced an
action for contribution.
COMMENT
Section 6. [Effect of Release].
A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered
into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person
from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any
other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides.
However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons
is reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable
share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2.
COMMENT
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DJustration No.9. (Equitable lbares
previously established by court).
A lUes B and e. His damages are
$20,000.
A is found 40% at fault.
B is found 30% at fault.
e is found 30% at fault.
A, with a joint-and.everal judg-
ment for t6,000 against B and e,
collects the whole amount from B.
On proper motion to the court, B is
entitled to contribution from e in the
amount of $3,000.
DJustration No. 10. (Equitable shares
not established).
A lUes B. His damages are $20,000.
A is found 40% at fault.
Effect of release on liability ofother
tortfeasors. The provision that release
of one tortfeasor does not release the
others unless the release 10 provides
is taken from the Uniform Contribu-
F-21
B is found 60% at fault.
Judgment for A for $12,000 is paid
byB.
B then brings a eeparate action
eeeking contribution from e, who was
not a party to the original action.
e is found to be liable for the same
injury, and as between B and e, C is
found to be 50% at fault.
Judgment for contribution for $6,-
000 is awarded to B.
If A had voluntarily joined or been
brought in as a party to this ~nd
action, proportionate fault would have
been determined for all parties, in-
cluding A and B, and contribution
against C would have been awarded
on that basis.
tion Among Tortfeasors Act (1955). It
is a common statutory provision.
Effect of release on right of contri-
bution. The qu8ftion of the contribu-
tion rights of tortfeasors A and B
!
apinIt tortfeuor C. who _ttled and B. 80% at fault (equitable Ihare.
obtained a releue or covenant not to t6.000)
we .&nita of three auwen: (l) A aDd C. ~ at fault (equitable Ihare.
B are .wI able to obtain contribution "'.000)
apiDIt Co despite the nleue. (2) A D. lK at fault (equitable abare.
·"d B are Dot entitled to OODtributiOD ell 000'\ .
... .... 1
UDleu the releue wu liven not in A'. claim II reduced by B'. equita-
pod faith but by way or coUUlion. ble Ihare ••000). He it awarded a
and (8) the plaintUr. total claim II Judgment apiDIt C and D. makin,
reduced by the proportionate Ihare or them jointly and IeYerally Ii8ble for
C. Each or the three IOlutioDi has - 000
wbstaDtial disadvantages. Jet each .... .
has been adopted in ODe or the UDi- Their equitable aJwo. or the obliga-
form acta. The flnt IOlutiOD W8I ticm are "'.000 and '2.000 reapec-
adopted by the 1939 UDif'orm C4ntri- tively.
bution Act. Ita disadvantage II that it DlUBtratiOlJ No. U. Releue to ODe
discourages Iettlementa; a tortt'euor tortreuor aDother·. abare II uncoU~
has no incentive to lettle if' he ~ Ible).
mains liable for contributiOD. The eec- Same facta as in IDustration No. 11.
ODd IOlution was adopted by the 1955 It ill now found that D'. Ihare of
C4ntribution Act. While it theoreti- '2.000 ill uncoUectible. Upon proper
cally encourages lett1ementa. it may . motion to the court that Ihare is real-
be unfair to the other defendants aDd located as foUows:
if' the good-faith requirement is con· A'. equitable abare II increued by
lCientiously enforced lettlements may ~ (hie own proportionate fault), plus
be diIcour.,ed. ~ (B'. proportionate fault). or '1,556.
The third IOlution is adopted in this C'. equitable abare is increued by
Section. Although it may have lOme ~ or tuf.
tendency to diIeourage a claimant ImmWJities. The problem or a
from enteriDg into a lettlement. this wrongdoer who is entitled to a legal
IOlution is fairly based on the propor· immunity could be treated like a ~
tionate-fault principle. • leued tortfeuor in this Section-join
"Disclwps . . . mm all Jisbi1jty him to the action to determine his
for contribution." A reallocated Ihare equitable abare or the obligation aDd
or contribution. as provided in Section .ubtract it from the amount or the
2(d), comes within the meaning or this claimant'. recovery. But this would
phrase, aDd the di8charge of the ~ unfairly cast the whole lOIS on the
Ieued pel"lOn under this Section a,. claimant. Thill might be adjUlted by
plies to that liability as weU. Since .preading the immune party'. obliga-
the claim is reduced by the amount or tiOD among all or the parties at fault.
the releued pel"lOn·. equitable abare. including the claimant, as in Sublec-
the increued amount or that ahare as tion 2(d). But this lame result is a1Io
a result or the reallocation is charged accomplilhed by leaviDg the immune
against the releum, pel"lOn. party out or the action altogether; a
DlUBtration No. JJ. (EfFect or releue). far easier and aimpler IOlution. Thill
A was iDJured through the concur· Act therefore makes no provision for
rent negligence of B. C and D. His immunities. It mUlt be borne in mind.
damages are '20.000. A lettles with B however. that lOme ltatee treat lOme
for '2,000. immunities as not applying to a .uit
The trial produces the foUowing for contribution. This raiIes difFerent
resulta: problems. which CIlD be handled un-
A, 409'D at fault (equitable Ihare. der third-party practice.
18.000) Worler~ COlDpeDIoItion. AD injured
F-22
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Section 8. [Short Title]
This Act may be cited as the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
Section 11. [Repeal] .-
The following acts and parts of acts are re~ed:
Section 10. [Prospective Effect of Act]
This Act applies to all [claims for relief] [causes of action]
accruing after its effective date.
Section 7. [Uniformity of Application and Construction]
This Act shall be applied and construed so as to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of this Act among states enacting it.
-
iIlappropriate to iIlclude a aection on
the problem ill '_uniform act.
SeverallOlutioDl are poesible. Thus,
contribution against the employer
may be provided for. Or the recovery
by the employee may be reduced by
the proportionate Ibare of the em-
ployer. Or the amount of that propor-
tionate Ihare may be divided eveDly
between the employer aDd employee,
10 that the compeneation I)'Btem
bears neponeibility for it. ProvisiOD
also needs to be made for the relation
of the tort defendant to the compensa-
tion benefits. In aDy event, contribu-
tory Degligence on the part of the
employee will come within the ecope
of this Act and will afFect the amount
of recovery.
employee who has received or iI enti-
tled to worker', compeJ18ation benefitB
from his employer may ordinarily
bring .a tort action againlt a third
party, Rch u the manufacturer of
the machine that iJVured him, and
recover for his iDjW')' ill full. Under
the rule ill most .tatee, the defendant
it Dot eDtitled to contribution from
the employer, even though the em-
ployer was negligent ill maiDtainiDg
the machine or instructing the em-
ployee ill ita use. This c:utiDg of the
wbole lOIS on the tort defendant may
be unfair aDd greatly ill need of legis-
lative adjustment. It iI 10 alI'ected by
the policies underlying the worker',
compensation systems, however, aDd
these policies vary 10 ,ubstantially in
the 8everal .tates that it was felt
Section 9. [Severability]
If any provision of this Act or application of it to any person
or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect
other provisions or applications of the Act that can be given
effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this
end the provisions of this Act are severable.
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COMMENT
A ltate that has adopted either of
the two Uniform Contribution AmODg
'J'ortfUlOJ'l Act.t will of coune plaD to
repeal it. Tbia II aleo true of other
ltatutory proviIiona on contribution
for tortfeuon.
'J'hiB Act does not DeC8l8itate any
chaugee in the ltatutory Jauguap of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, but it may have the e8'ect of
alightly modifying lOme of the Qnn.
menta to H 2-814 to 2-816 and ~716
on proximate C8U1e and the e8'ect of
contributory fault.
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WORKING TOWARD SETTLEMENT
E. Andre Busald William J. Kathman, Jr.
226 Main Street
Florence, KY 41042-6910
(606) 371-3600
I. INVESTIGATION AND DEVELOPMENT
A. A good client interview
1. Background
2. Employment
3. Education
4. Observations of facts
5. Other witnesses and evidence
B. A good case investigation
1. Fact witnesses
2. physical evidence
3. Experts
C. Developing medical proof
1. All records
2. Reports with prognosis
3. Demonstrative evidence
D. Investigation of Law
1. Getting all causes of action
2. Cases and statutes to support your theory and refute
defenses
G-l
E. Investigation of value
j
II.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
THE CLIENT
ATLA Reporter, KATA Advocate
Other reporters
PI Valuation Handbook
Rule of thumb formulas
Fellow attorney opinions - KATA clinic
Local verdicts
A. INITIAL INTERVIEW & CONTINUING CONTACT
1. Getting the client to think in terms of money - putting
a dollar value on the case in general and later in
specific
2. Getting the client to think realistically
a. What is and is not compensable
b. Real value vs. psychological value
c. Send reports of similar cases in local courts
3. Explaining the process to your client
a. First demand is not what he can expect to recover
J
J
J
J
b. Fees and expenses will come out of final settlement J
c. First offer will be low
d. Trials are expensive
e. Time value of money
f. Negotiation is not all under your control - it
is an adversarial process
III. POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES OF THE CASE
A. Liability Facts
1. Who dunni t
G-2
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2. Comparative Fault and Apportionment
3. Multiple parties
4. Absent parties
B. Personality/Appearance of Client/Family Witnesses
1. Will they be believed
2. Will the jury be motivated to help
C. Who is the Defendant
1. Target
2. Sympathetic
D. Do the facts support the claimant injury
1. Phantom damage/low impact
2. Strange slip and fall facts
E. Priors
1. Medical history
2. Lawsuits
3. Other claims
4. Criminal records
F. Injury and Treatment
1. Objective injury
2. Subjective injury
3. Unusual injury
4. Course of treatment
5. Quality of medical witnesses
G. Amount and Credibility of Specials
1. Well documented
2. Beware prescriptions - other conditions
3. Wages, length off
G-3
-Track record, not what might have been
-Tax returns
H. Aggravating Factors
1. Alcohol
2. High profile target defendant
3. Punitive liability facts
4. Blood and Guts
-Photos
-Scars
I. Venue
1. Area
-Metro
-Rural
-Very Rural - who is suing who?
2. Judge
3. Jury
-other awards from the same panel
J. Insurance Coverage
1. Limits, private assets
2. Bad Faith Letters - excess
3. Coverage questions
K. Legal Realities
1. Medical malpractice
2. Product liability
3. Statutory defenses (e.g., public recreation land,
statute of limitations, immunities)
G-4
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IV. SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL
A. WHEN TO MAKE A DEMAND OR AN OFFER
1. Before filing
2. After filing, early
3. After depositions
4. Before trial
5. During trial
6. Post verdict
B. SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT
1. Assessment of positives and negatives of the case
2. Discuss client expectations
3. Discuss verdict ranges and settlement ranges
4. Get Demand Authority and if possible get a figure that
should be strongly considered
C. MAKE SURE YOU HAVE AUTHORITY BEFORE MAKING AN OFFER
1. The client can be held to the offer
2. The attorney could become liable to the client
3. Form authorizations - see example
4. Always copy demand to client
D. WAYS OF MAKING A DEMAND
1. A formal settlement evaluation in pleading/booklet form
a. Can vary in degree of completeness
b. More ways to impress the defense
2. A letter in the form of a summation
_-~ - ---~. - -oral demands and offers (generally to be avoided)
4. Protect yourself against admissions of facts. Qualify
your statements
G-5
E. THE NEED FOR A HIGH FIRST DEMAND - NO "WATER", NO SETTLEMENT
1. The appearance of compromise and reasonableness
2. The need to save face
a. Lawyer
b. Adjuster
3. The "Time Honored System"
-You can't swim upstream
4. The "low ball" offer - the system works both ways
F. TACTICS
1. Taking a position - present a "case" supporting
your demand
2. Good to make a concession first, plan ahead by having
something to concede
3. Use objective criteria - insurance companies want
documentation
4. "Good guy - bad guy"
5. Having the client present - <sometimes, it not
only helps your case, but also makes the client
more reasonable)
6. Using audio-visual aids
7. Will your Judge get involved
G. ALWAYS DECIDE IN ADVANCE WHAT YOU WILL TAKE
1. Value
2. Odds of winning
3. Costs
4. Time value of money
5. Try to plan so that the final figure is the one
G-6
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V.
you wanted in the first place
H. USE OF MOTIONS TO SPUR SETTLEMENT
1. Motions to obtain or determine facts
a. Motion to produce plaintiff's written statements
b. Motion to produce defendant's written statements
c. Motion to produce witnesses' written statements
d. Motion to produce expert written statements
e. Motion to produce photographs, diagrams, etc.
f. Motion to discover insurance policy limits
g. Motion for summary judgment
2. Motions to Eliminate Prejudicial Evidence
a. Motion to strike pleadings
b. Motion to limit evidence (Motions in Limine)
I. STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS
1. Tailored to certain clients and/or clients needs
2. Ability to pay
3. Market interest rates
4. Present value to calculate fee
5. Future medicals and wages
ALWAYS:
A. KNOW ALL ASPECTS OF YOUR CASE
B. MAINTAIN GOOD CLIENT RELATIONS, CONTROL IS THE TRUE SECRET
C. NEGOTIATE AGAINST A DEAD LINE
D_.~ BE-WILLING TO TALK ABOUT SETTLEMENT
E. HAVE AUTHORITY BEFORE MAKING AN OFFER OF COMPROMISE
F. USE BAD FAITH LETTERS IN EXCESS CASES
G. CONSIDER TIME AND EXPENSE
G-7
H. COMMUNICATE WITH YOUR CLIENT
VI. FALLACIES
A. ALWAYS TAKE THE THIRD (OR FIFTH) OFFER
B. YOU CAN NEVER RAISE YOUR DEMAND - (when you can -
when you can't)
C. EVERYBODY LIES
D. YOU CAN'T SETTLE WITHOUT FILING SUIT
E. NOTHING SAID IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IS ADMISSIBLE IN
COURT (protect yourself)
F. YOU WILL ALWAYS GET MORE RIGHT BEFORE TRIAL
G. NEVER ACCEPT A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" OFFER
H. NEVER TAKE THE FIRST OFFER
I. NEVER REVEAL YOUR CASE
J. THE PLAINTIFF ALWAYS HAS TO MAKE A DEMAND FIRST
K. NEVER BID AGAINST YOURSELF
VII. CREATIVE SETTLEMENT TECHNIQUES
A. PAPER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT DENIED COVERAGE
B. MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS
C. NO FAULT STRETCH. KRS 304.39-140(3)
VIII. CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF TAXATION AND SUBROGATION
A. WHAT IS TAXABLE
1. Wages
2. Business income
3. Not pain and suffering
4. Not medical expenses
5. Not wrongful death
G-8
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B. WHAT IS SUBROGATED
1. Check health and accident policy
2. Has client been put on notice
3. PIP
4. Comp
C. STRUCTURE OF PAYMENT
1. What the IRS will accept
2. What will stand up against the insurance company's
subro claim
3. Limited funds
D. THE AGREED ORDER AND SIGNED RELEASE - DISBURSEMENT OF
CHECKS - CLIENT RELATIONS ON THE OTHER END OF THE PROCESS
G-9
NEGOTIATING
Based Upon
YOU CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING by Herb Cohen
I. Negotiation is a field of knowledge and endeavor that
focuses on gaining the favor of people from whom we want
things.
A. Almost everything is negotiable, from prices to
check-out times, because these things themselves are
the products of negotiation.
B. The three crucial variables to every negotiation are
power, time and information. These determine success
or failure.
II. Power is the capacity to get things done. It is a neutral
concept, neither ethical or unethical.
A. Complaints about power focus on two things:
1. Unhappiness with the method of exercising power.
2. Disapproval of the desired end being brought
about by the use of the power.
B. Power is in the eye of the beholder. Simply by
believing you have power and conveying that impression
you will cause the other party to the negotiation to
behave as if you have power.
C. Various sources of power in negotiations.
1. By creating competition for something you possess.
2. Legitimacy - official looking signs and documents
carry a great deal of authority. However, this
power can be challenged. Use the power of legiti-
G-10
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
-13.
macy when it will help you and challenge it when
it will not.
Intelligent risk taking. When you can't afford to
take a risk of losing something you have to have,
you lose power.
Spead the risk out and gather support for your
proposal from those on your side of the
negotiation. Consolidate your position.
Specialized skills, experience, or technical
knowledge.
Become aware of the real needs of your opponents.
These may be very different than those issues
which are stated openly.
The more time and effort an opponent has invested
in the negotiation, the more power you have.
Rewards and punishments
a) No one will really negotiate with you unless
they think you can help or hurt them.
b) Do not publicly eliminate options without
getting something in return.
Get the other side to identify with you.
Use ethical and moral standards by pointing out
that they are on your side.
Precedent - use it but don't be hidebound by it.
Persistence.
Persuasive ability - is more important than logic.
a) The other person must understand what you're
G-ll
saying.
b) The evidence should seem overwhelming.
c) Most importantly, there must be an appeal
to the others needs and desires.
14. Increase your power by having a relaxed attitude.
Usually, you will do a better job negotiating
for someone else rather than yourself.
III. The passage of time dramatically affects negotiations.
A. The most significant concessions in any negotiation
occur right before a party reaches their deadline.
B. The best strategy is not to reveal your real deadline
to the other side.
C. Rapid action should only be taken when it will be to
your advantage. Generally, this will be after a
period of slow development as the other party's
deadline approaches.
IV. Information is the heart of all negotiations.
A. Since it is so valuable, there usually must be a
reciprocal exchange of information.
B. Effective listening and observation techniques can
be a valuable source of information as to the other
sides real needs.
V. A negotiating style of winning at all costs may be effec-
tive in a single instance, but it is counterproductive in
a continuing relationship. This style is called the
Win-Lose approach.
A. Six elements of Win-Lose negotiation.
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1. Extreme initial positions.
2. Negotiators generally have very limited
authority.
3. Emotional tactics. The best way to neutralize
these is simply to perceive them for what they
are.
4. Tendency to view concessions made by the other
side as indications of weakness rather than good
faith admissions or negotiations.
5. Reluctancy to make any concessions of their own.
6. Ignoring deadlines.
B. When faced with a Win-Lose negotiation you can either:
1. Cancel the negotiation or
2. Fight these tactics with your own or
3. Attempt to switch the relationship to a collabora-
tive effort with two winners
VI. Win-Win negotations are those resulting in mutual satis-
faction.
A. Use the process to meet the other side's needs as well
as your own.
B. Attempt to harmonize or reconcile the real needs of
those on each side of the negotiation.
C. Understand the causes of conflicts. They may come
from experience, information, or the role they play
in negotiating.
D. Build a relationship of trust between both parties.
_______ --l---e... -This·· is a long process that should begin long
_.~ ,_.--~.-------- ---
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before the formal negotiation.
2. Conduct the formal negotiation by emphasizing the
ends of the negotiation rather than the means
involved.
E. There are two forms of opposition:
1. Idea opponents disagree on a particular issue.
These can be converted to allies by examining
real needs and seeking a compromise or a1terna-
tive position.
2. Visceral opponents disagree with both your point
of view and your particular personality. These
generally can't be converted; it is best to simply
avoid making these opponents.
a) Attitude is a leading cause of visceral
J
J
J
-
opposition
b) Avoid judging the other's acts or motivations. J
VII. Telephone Negotiations
A. These are more prone to causing misunderstandings.
They are generally quicker and less likely to be
successful
B. Negotiations are more competitive over the phone.
C. The advantage in phone negotiations is strongly with
the caller because he can prepare in advance.
D. Always write a memorandum of agreement for all te1e-
phone negotiations. The party who writes the memo-
randum has a better position because he decides the
form.
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VIII. Negotiating with Organizations
A. Establish a relationship with one particular member
and try to work through them.
B. If that is unsuccessful, move up another level in the
heirarchy and try again.
c. The most important thing in any negotiation with
an organization is to establish a personal relation-
ship so that they will view you as a human being with
wants and needs rather than a statistic.
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MEDICALS
95.00
435.00
1,097.00
1,274.00
$1,145.00
SETTLEMENT EVALUATION
AND DEMAND AS OF 5/14/87
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
STATISTICAL DATA
BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
FILE NO.
G-16
Michael A. Grefer, M.D.
10/25/84 - 9/02/86
WAGES: Patricia worked as a school teacher and earned an
NAME: Patricia Plaintiff
MARITAL STATUS: Married
Richard T. Sheridan, M.D.
12/03/84 - 5/24/85
Plaintiff has incurred medical charges in the amount of
Ayse Lee, M.D.
04/04/86 to 09/30/86
S. Michael Lawhon, M.D.
01/27/86 - 06/05/87
Peter J. Stearn, M.D.
03/05/86 and 01/19/87
Plaintiff
Defendant
vs.
PATRICIA PLAINTIFF
DEFENDANT BUS TRANSIT
days of teaching school and had to miss numerous lessons,
average weekly wage of $543.00. She also earned income as a
sustaining a total loss of income of $7,823.00. Worker's
Piano instructor. As a result of the wreck, Patty missed 70
compensation has paid approximately $4,300.00 of this amount.
$6,960.44 as a result of this wreck.
ahead of him.
first seat of the bus on the curb side aisle. She was the
On November 28, 1984, Patricia Plaintiff was a passenger in
71.00
383.00
269.00
203.00
415.21
254.00
245.00
539.73
110.00
424.50
$6,960.44TOTAL:
Radiology Associates
11/30/84 to 12/03/85
Cincinnati Neurological
08/29/85 to 01/24/86
Thomas Mayer, M.D.
05/15/85 to 06/12/85
Anesthesia Associates
04/17/87
Christ Hospital
04/17/87
St. Luke Hospital
11/30/84 to 12/03/85
University Rehabilitation, Inc.
N.W. Schwegman, M.D.
12/02/85 to 12/16/85
St. Elizabeth Medical Center
12/15/84, 01/18/85
Prescriptions
CAUSE OF ACTION:
failing to provide Patty a reasonably safe bus and the driver
was negligent for failing to keep a safe and clear distance
Patty brings this negligence action against Defendant Bus
Transit. Defendant Bus Transit Company, was negligent by
Defendant Bus Transit. The bus was taking Pat's third grade
class on a field trip to the Symphony. Patty was sitting in the
a ~69-school bus owned and operated by a charter bus company,
r
r
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second person seated in that bench, and was seated near the
aisle as opposed to being seated near the window.
The Plaintiff's seat was unique in that it was the only
seat on the old bus that did not have some type of forward
protection. Every other person seated either had another seat
or a protection panel in front of him. Patty's bench seat had a
panel in front of it, but the panel only extended half way
across the bench leaving her seat unprotected. As a result, any
crash or sudden stop would create a greater danger for her than
every other passenger on the bus.
As the bus was traveling along a city street, a car pulled
out in front of the bus and stopped. As a result, the bus
driver slammed his brakes and stopped suddenly. Patty Plaintiff
was thrown from her chair, her hand and her arm struck an
unpadded portion of a pole in front of her and she fell into the
dashboard and down into the bus stairwell. The bus driver
testified that when the car pulled in front of him, he thought
it was going to immediately turn left onto another street. When
the car could not make the turn, it stopped partially in the
same lane as the bus occupied. The bus driver then slammed his
brakes in an attempt to avoid a collision, throwing Patty into
the pole in front of the bus causing her injury. No contact was
made with the car and it was never identified.
EVALUATION
The Plaintiff asserts that the cause of her injury stems
from the negligence of the bus driver in operating the bus, and
in the negligence of the bus company by failing to provide her
G-18
under the same situation.
utmost skill which other skilled bus drivers would have used
Shelton Taxi v. Bowling, Ky. 51 S.W.2d 468
Dr. Yeager is very familiar with the school bus
with a safe bus. These theories aren't alternative, but dual.
was going to make a turn onto another street and that he would
be able to continue driving down the road. When the car had to
The bus driver testified that he felt the car in front of him
and foresight.
his brakes in order to avoid a collision. Given that this was a
stop because it could not make its turn, he then had to slam on
chartered bus engaged in the business of transporting passengers
for hire, the bus company owed Patricia a duty of utmost skill
The Plaintiff further alleges that the bus company was
negligent by failing to provide a safe bus. In 1977, Federal
Regulations mandated forward protection for all buses
manufactured thereafter. This wreck occurred seven years after
trial Dr. Arthur Yeager, D.D.S., an expert in the field of bus
that regulation took effect and although the bus was
exposed seat creates a great hazard. A bus company using utmost
manufactured in 1969, the Defendant was put on notice that an
(1932). The Plaintiff submits that the bus driver failed to use
industry and has-l-ong advocated seat belts and increased padding
skill and foresight would take measures to protect passengers
on buses. He will testify that this incident should have been
from the dangers of that seat. The Plaintiff plans to call to
safety.
prevented by eliminating the seat or using it last, providing a
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seat belt for that seat, adding a full protection panel in front
G-19
front of her and into the dashboard, Patty suffered a severe
As a result of being thrown from her seat into the pole in
After conferring with our client and reviewing this file,
unable to play her musical instruments which provided a great
We
We
As a result of these
The Plaintiff submits
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DEMAND
Within that number, we will negotiate
N.R. Company, Ky, 21 S.W.2d 990 (1929).
that the Defendant bus company had a duty to modify its buses as
science and skill made known over time.
injuries, Patricia had to miss several days of school and was
underwent surgery on her right elbow.
temporo mandibular joint problems, right lateral epicondylitis,
creates a great risk to passengers.
skill made known that the failure to provide forward protection
of the seat, and as a minimum alternative by padding the pole in
front of the seat from top to bottom.
paronychia and dislocation of R-2 finger and subsequently
think this offer represents a reasonable opening demand.
cervical and lumbar strain, ringing in her ears with possible
deal of pleasure for her.
the amount of $75,000.00.
a full settlement with the worker's compensation carrier.
we are in a position to place a settlement demand upon you in
feel that we have a very solid case of liability, based on the
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fact that the common carrier owes the highest duty of care.
and
By: :-:W:=I'='L~'-::-H":::'::-:-::"::::==-=~-r-:l:--------
Att
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July 27, 1987
Mr. E. Andre' Busald
Mr. William J. Kathman
BUSALD FUNK ZEVELY
226 Main Street
Florence, KY 41042
RE: Plaintiff v. Defendant Bus Transit
Dear Andy and Bill:
After reviewing this file, I feel that your opening demand
of $75,000.00 is not at all reasonable. I feel that your opinion
that you have a very solid case of liability is unfounded.
As you know, witnesses have testified that the driver operating
the bus had no time to bring the bus to a safe stop in avoiding
collision with the unknown vehicle in front of him.
I do not feel that the bus company was in any way negligent
by providing Patty transportation in Bus No. 104. This bus
complies with all State and Federal Regulations, and cannot be
fitted with a protection panel extending all the way in front of
the bench seat in question, for it would block the aisle way and
would create even a greater hazard. The Federal regulations
which you allude to in your demand settlement package are not
applicable to this bus in that it was not manufactured in 1977 or
later. The bus company does not have a duty to provide an
absolutely 100% safe bus.
Also, we feel many of the medical bills which you have
submitted are not related to the incident in question. Patricia
had complained of neck and back problems prior to the accident
and was being treated for those problems. Also, her tennis elbow
problems are very probably the result of her continuous violin
practice. It is not an uncommon situation to find a violinist
with tennis elbow problems such as Pattys. She has testified
that she practices two to three hours a day, seven days a week
and such strain on the elbow could definitely cause the
discomfort she has developed. It is also obvious that the
ringing problem Patty had with her ears has been solved and that
no further complications with TMJ are anticipated. We simply do
not feel that the great nature and extent of her injuries as
described is the result of this incident. Perhaps the
dislocation of her right finger was the result of hitting a bar
or some object in front of her, but we do not feel that her
$7,000.00 medical and $7,000.00 wage loss is attributable to this
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event, and further do not feel that it could have been prevented
by the Defendant.
----Howe~~~in_~rder to avoid further litigation, and with the
consent of my client, Lam in the position to offer you an amount
of $12,000.00 to fully~sen1.e-a-ny claims against the Defendant.
Within that number you would of course have to negotiate a
settlement with the worker's compensation carrier.
Sincerely yours,
Defendant Lawyer
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SAMPLE: FORM FOR CLIENT'S AUTHORIZATION
OF SETTLEMENT FIGURES
Client: . _
Client's Authority
J
J
I
J
J
1. Date:
2. Date: _
3. Date: _
4. Date:
I authorize settlement for $ gross.
Client
I authorize settlement for $ gross.
Client
I authorize settlement for $ gros s.
Client
I authorize settlement for $ gross.
i
J
J
.~
.J
J
Record of Negotiation
offer of not less than $ gross is received.
Date: I authorize my Attorneys to proceed to trial unless an
1. Date: _
2. Date: _
3. Date: _
4. Date: _
Client
Demand made: $ Date: Offer: $
Demand made: $ Date: Offer: $
Demand made: $ Date: Offer: $
Demand made: $ Date: Offer: $
Client's Final Authority
J
J
J
J
J
J
Client
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